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 Though some influentially critical objections have been raised during the ‘classical’ pre-
computational simulation philosophy of science (PCSPS) tradition, suggesting a more nuanced 
methodological category for experiments2, it safe to say such critical objections have greatly proliferated 
in philosophical studies dedicated to the role played by computational simulations in science.  For 
instance, Eric Winsberg (1999-2003) suggests that computer simulations are methodologically unique in 
the development of a theory’s models3 suggesting new epistemic notions of application.  This is also 
echoed in Jeffrey Ramsey’s (1995) notions of “transformation reduction,”—i.e., a notion of reduction of a 
more highly constructive variety.4   Computer simulations create a broadly continuous arena spanned by 
normative and descriptive aspects of theory-articulation, as entailed by the notion of transformation 
reductions occupying a continuous region demarcated by Ernest Nagel’s (1974) logical-explanatory 
“domain-combining reduction” on the one hand, and Thomas Nickels’ (1973) heuristic “domain-
preserving reduction,” on the other.  
 
 I extend Winsberg’s and Ramsey’s points here, by arguing that in the field of computational fluid 
dynamics (CFD) as well as in other branches of applied physics, the computer plays a constitutively 
experimental role—supplanting in many cases the more traditional experimental methods such as flow-
visualization, etc.  In this case, however CFD algorithms act as substitutes, not supplements (as the 
notions “simulation” suggests) when it comes to experimental practices.  I bring up the constructive 
example involving the Clifford-Algebraic algorithms for modeling singular phenomena (i.e., vortex 
formation, etc.) in CFD by Gerik Scheuermann (2000) and Steven Mann & Alyn Rockwood (2003) who 
demonstrate that their algorithms offer greater descriptive and explanatory scope than the standard 
Navier-Stokes approaches.  The mathematical distinction between Navier-Stokes-based and Clifford-
Algebraic based CFD (i.e., NSCFD and CACFD) has essentially to do with the regularization features 
(i.e., overcoming and conditioning singularities) exhibited to a far greater extent by the latter, than the 
former.5  Hence, CACFD indicate that the utilization of computational techniques can be based on 
principled reasons (i.e., the ability to characterize singular phenomena in ways that traditional 
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Friedel, 2001).  Granted, the latter two published in the decades in which philosophical studies of computer 
simulations were already in full sway, nevertheless I deem them “traditional” since the topic of computer 
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experimental methodologies are too coarse-grained to meet the explanatory demands suggested by CFD), 
as opposed to merely practical (i.e., that such computational procedures better fit the bill-literally!-in 
terms of contingent resource allocation).  CACFD hence exhibit a new generative role in the field of fluid 
mechanics, by offering categories of experimental evidence that are optimally descriptive and 




In pre-computational simulation philosophy of science (PCSPS6), the analysis of scientific 
methodology subdivides itself into three natural kinds: the hypothesis/(es) H to be tested, with 
respect to the evidence E deemed relevant vis-à-vis H.  Moreover, the relevance criteria 
characterizing the relationship of H with respect to E inevitably involves, to a certain extent, the 
“background” B consisting of the vast repository of epistemic, semantic, and ontological factors 
not directly entailed by H’s scope—whether logical or evidential.  In this respect, experiments 
play a pivotal role in negotiating aspects of H, E, B—as the traditional accounts go—in serving 
an essential aim in (dis/)confirming H.  For example, in this regard, perhaps Thomas Kuhn 
(1962) was the first to suggest such an essential methodological role entailed by experiments, 
since his notion of paradigm suggested the aspects of theory, applications, instrumentation, and 
nomology, all mutually dynamically interacting in a virtuously circular manner. 
Nowadays, such facile global characterizations of the role played by experiments have been 
supplanted by particularly nuanced treatments, teeming with suggestions attempting to 
characterize their evidential roles in (more or less) semi-autonomous fashion. By and large, 
much of this appears to involve, in some irreducible fashion, closer scrutiny of the role played by 
values (as Kuhn (1977) already suggested in the case of theory-choice).  For instance, Helen 
Longino (1992, 1998) attempts to characterize “scientific objectivity” in such a manner 
essentially involving aspects of socialized epistemology, out of which a objectivity would entail 
a potential “transformational criticism” including an irreducible admixture of cognitive and 
contextual values.7  According to Longino, the complex interplay of cognitive and contextual 
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values is evident, for instance, in four possible ways a hypothesis H may be evaluated in terms of 
its putative evidence E: 
• Evidentially Criticizing the quality of  E  
• Conceptually (1): Questioning the nature of a H’s “conceptual soundness”  
• Conceptually (2):  Questioning the nature of H’s “consistency with accepted body of 
theories.”8 (1998, 173)  
• Conceptually (3):  How relevant is E as a “support” to H ? 
 
Indeed, it is the third conceptual kind of appraisal which “amounts to questioning the 
background beliefs [of scientists] …crucial for the problem of objectivity.” (ibid.) 
 The layers of evaluation of H vis-à-vis E, though for Longino comprising a project of 
broader scope than that entailed by the study of experimentation per se, appear especially 
relevant in the case of some of the recent literature on computational simulation9. 
In order to avoid the appearance of there being anything strange or paradoxical about a 
practice [e.g., computer simulations] that straddles the terrain between the theoretical and 
the experimental, we need to recognize that while simulation is, in the general sense, a 
form of what we once naively called theorizing, it is the kind of theorizing that has only 
recently begun to attract philosophical attention—construction of local, representative, 
models.  (Winsberg (2003), 120) 
 
The history of a simulation technique is very much like the history of a scientific 
instrument.  It begins with a relatively crude and simple technique for attacking a 
relatively small set of problems. Over time, the instrument or technique is called upon to 
attack a larger set of problems or to achieve a higher degree of accuracy.  In order to 
achieve this, the technique needs to be improved upon, reconfigured, and ever radically 
revised.  In each case, the knowledge relied upon to devise and sanction the tool or 
method can come from a wide variety of domains. (Winsberg (2003), 123-134, italics 
added) 
 
The points discussed above by Winsberg lends credence to what he describes as simulations 
“having a life of their own” (1999, 2003) insofar as they (as in the general case of model-
building)  or “semiautonomous” insofar as although “[p]rima facie they [simulations] are nothing 
                                                                                                                                                       
opposed to merely disclosing semantic content.  O’Neill & Manson highlight such issues in the area of bioethics, 
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8
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9
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but applications of scientific theories to systems under the theories’ domain,” (2003, 105) 
nevertheless in their ‘theory-articulation’10 “there is no algorithm for reading models off a 
theory.” (106)  Undoubtedly, among other factors, the role played by simulations is emblematic 
of the complex and multilayered means by which evidence may be evaluated in terms of its 
counterpart theory or hypothesis, as suggested by Longino’s schema. 
 Reliability is the constitutive feature of simulations which is derived both from the 
credentials of its governing theory as well “the antecedently established credentials of the model 
building techniques developed over an extended tradition of employment,” (122) of which no 
general algorithm can instantiate.11  Winsberg sounds a generally skeptical note regarding 
making any inferences suggesting (in a fashion which would avoid begging the question) any 
realist interpretation of the simulation (insofar as them displaying any irreducible element of 
bona fide representational capacity), as levied in his criticisms of Hughes (1999) in his 2003 
(113-116) as well as in his “counterexample that success implies truth” discussed in the case of 
artificial viscosity (2006). 
   This is a rendition of Larry Laudan’s (1981, 1998) criticism against scientific realism 
applied specifically to the case of simulation.12  Certainly attacks against realism are established 
in the canonical “classical” literature,13 and little would be gained here from dredging up the 
debate tout court.14 Nevertheless, as I argue below, there may be good reasons not to entirely 
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assumptions, and often requires appealing to assumptions from…sometimes incompatible theories.” (Frisch, 2005, 
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building, rather than as representative of structures of the world.”(11) 
12
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subdivided into the following (distinct but not disjunct) classes (the list is by no means exhaustive): i.) Pessimistic 
meta-induction arguments: If the historical arc of science bends toward truth, to paraphrase Martin Luther King’s 
metaphor, how does this normative claim square with the obvious historically factual claim that the history of 
science is a vast graveyard of abandoned theories?  ii.) Problem of induction: Past success is no guarantee of future 
success, etc., iii.) Methodological problems bedeviling verisimilitude, should some (like more recently in the case of 
Kitcher (2001)) suggest some kind of epistemic convergence. 
14
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13) above include Richard Boyd’s (1985) realism based on historical and methodological grounds (which may or 
may not, depending on one’s views on the matter, provide a response to the pessimistic meta-induction claim).  
Other relatively more recent responses against the pessimistic meta-induction include Stathis Psillos’ (1996) divide 
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abandon realist considerations, when considering the case of Clifford Algebraic computational 
fluid mechanics (CACFD)—in particular, a realism suggestive of both elements of Giere’s 
(1988) and Hacking’s (1982, 1998) separate uses (and senses) of term: “constructive realism.”15 
At best (a’ la Sellars (1962)) I can only do this via some general inference to the best explanation 
strategy which (at best) would offer reasons for such a nuanced realism.  However, even if the 
reader remains unconvinced or agnostic, at the very least I aim to show herein that CACFD 
represent a new class of experiments.      
 
II. Clifford Algebra: A Brief Overview 
 
The Cambridge mathematician William Kingdon Clifford originally developed his algebra16 
in the years 1878-1882 as a means to systematically develop a matrix algebra representing 
rotations and spin, generalized in any n-dimensional space: R n ( ){ }nkRxxx kn ≤≤∈= 1,|,...,1  
(where R are the real numbers).  In keeping with Clifford’s intentions, Hestenes (1984, 1986) and 
others ascribed the term ‘geometric’ to such classes of algebras to call attention to the primary 
feature of this mathematical system, portraying the class of all possible rotations (and spins) in 
n-dimensional space, which is an essentially geometrical dynamical property.   
Geometric algebras can be fundamentally thought of as systematic collections of directed 
line segments (vectors), areas (bivectors), volumes (trivectors),…, n-dimensional hypervolumes 
(n-vectors or n-blades) as bounded above by the dimensionality n of the algebra’s underlying 
                                                                                                                                                       
at impera claims—that components of a preceding theory (having some irreducibly ‘truth-tracking’ or 
representational capacity) shall survive into superseding theory, even when the former is tout court falsified. (The 
analogy of  ‘cannibalizing’ components of a junked car engine to be retro-fitted into another functioning car comes 
to mind.)   
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 For Giere, this has primarily to do with interpretations concerning the modal scope of models in a theory.  For 
instance, a constructive realist (narrowly defined) would argue that a model  M articulated by a theory T would agree 
with the actual history of all (or most) an experimental system S’s variables (1985, 83).  Broadly defined, a 
constructive realist (narrowly defined) would argue that M articulated by T would agree with all possible histories of 
all (or most) an experimental system S’s variables.  The constructive empiricist (a’ la Bas Van Fraassen (1980)) on 
the other hand, according to Giere, would argue that at best only the variables explicitly specified in M (e.g., position 
x an momentum p for the case of an SHO –simple harmonic oscillator—model) would agree with those measure in 
actual system S.  I take on the issue of Giere’s (1988) constructive realism and the “modal rationalism” David 
Chalmers’ (2002) particular version of 2D semantics in Kallfelz (2010).  Whereas Ian Hacking’s (1982) use centers 
itself specifically on the constructive characteristic of the “autonomous” role that experiments can play, in the 
epistemic and methodological aspects of representing and intervening. “We are completely convinced of the reality 
of electrons when we …build—and often succeed in building—new devices that use various well understood 
causal properties of electrons to interfere in other more hypothetical parts of nature.”  (Hacking (1982, 1998) 
1158.) 
16
 A vector space endowed with an associative product. For further technical details, see Appendix below. 
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vector space.  While the concept of a directed line segment seems intuitive enough (partly due to 
the historical success of the ‘rival’ vector algebra of Gibbs), the concept of directed surfaces, 
volumes, and hypervolumes may seem less so.  The concept of directed area however survives, 
for instance, in the geometric interpretation of a vector cross-product in R 3.  As a further 
indication of its vestigial ancestry to Clifford, the cross-product is actually an example of a 
bivector, or axial vector, as it changes sign under reversal of parity of the coordinate system 
(from a left-handed to a right-handed system, and vice versa) while regular vectors do not.   
Clifford algebras are graded: their generators form a basis of linearly independent k-vectors 
(where 0 ≤ k ≤ n), where n is the dimensionality of the underlying vector space.  For example, 
the Clifford algebra G(R3) over vector space R 3 is generated by a total of 23 = 8 grade k elements 
(where 0 ≤ k ≤ 3): 1 grade-0 element (the real scalars), 3 grade-1 elements (3 linearly 
independent vectors whose span is obviously R3), 3 grade-2 elements (3 linearly independent 
bivectors), and 1 grade-3 (trivector) element.  In general, for any vector space V of 
dimensionality n, its Clifford algebra is generated by a total of 2n grade k elements (where 0 ≤ k ≤  
n), the dimensionality of each Clifford subspace of uniform grade k is: ( ) ( )!! !, knk nknC −= .  That is 
to say, ( ) ( )!! !, knk nknC −=  linearly independent grade-k (or k-vector) elements generate the Clifford 
subspaces of uniform grade k.  In addition, the (associative) Clifford product can be decomposed 
into a grade-lowering (inner) product and a grade-raising (outer) product, from which the notions 
of dot and cross products survive in the standard (Gibbs) vector algebra of R 3.  For further 
details, see Appendix below.   
After being eclipsed into relative obscurity for almost a century by Gibbs’ vector notation,17 
the Clifford algebraic mathematical formalism (as well as its associated algebraic substructures 
like the Clifford groups) has enjoyed somewhat of a renaissance in the fields of physics (both 
purely theoretical as well as applied) and engineering in the last several decades. (Baugh 2003, 
Baylis 1995, Bolinder 1987, Conte 1993-2000, Finkelstein 1999-2004, Doren & Lasenby 2003, 
Gallier 2005, Hestenes 1984 -1986, Khrenikov 2005, Lansenby, et. al. 2000, Levine & Dannon 
2000, Mann et. al. 2003, Nebe 1999-2000, Scheuermann 2000, Sloane 2001, Snygg 1997, Van 
den Nest, et. al. 2005, Vlasov 2000). All the authors listed above (who comprise just a miniscule 
sample of the enormous body of literature on the subject of applications of Clifford Algebra in 
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physics and engineering) either describe the mathematical formalism as especially appealing, due 
to its providing a ‘unifying language’ in the field of mathematical physics18, or apply the 
formalism in key instances to make some interpretative point in the foundations of quantum 
theory, no matter how specific19 or general.20 
Clifford algebras can provide a complete notation for describing certain phenomena in 
physics that would otherwise require several different mathematical formalisms.  For instance, in 
present-day quantum mechanics and field theory, a variety of different mathematical formalisms 
are often introduced: 3 dimensional vector algebra, Hilbert space methods, spinor algebra, 
diffeomorphism algebra on smooth manifolds, etc.  This is due in part to the domain-specific 
nature of the aforementioned, all tailored to apply to a particularly specific context, but relatively 
restricted in their power of generalization. In contrast, as shall be shown below, Clifford Algebra 
provide a single and overarching formalism that can meet the needs of the mathematical 
physicist working in the applied as well as in the foundational domains. In Kallfelz (2009b) I 
argue that (a’ la Kuhn (1977)) the comparatively broader scope and simplicity (aside from the 
technical consistency concerning semantic isomorphisms between algebraic and geometric 
concepts) yield non-trivial claims concerning issues in intertheoretic reduction, that are of 
philosophical interest.21 
 
III. Navier Stokes and Clifford Algebraic Computational Fluid Dynamics 
 
In the field of computational fluid dynamics (CFD) as well as in other branches of 
applied physics, the computer plays a constitutively experimental role—supplanting in many 
cases the more traditional experimental methods such as flow-visualization, etc.  In this case, 
however CFD algorithms act as substitutes, not supplements (as the notions “simulation” 
suggests) when it comes to experimental practices.  I bring up the constructive example below 
involving the Clifford-Algebraic algorithms for modeling singular phenomena (i.e., vortex 
formation, etc.) in CFD by Gerik Scheuermann (2000) and Steven Mann & Alyn Rockwood 
(2003) who demonstrate that their algorithms offer greater descriptive and explanatory scope 
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than the standard Navier-Stokes approaches.  The mathematical distinction between Navier-
Stokes-based and Clifford-Algebraic based CFD (i.e., NSCFD and CACFD) has essentially to do 
with the regularization features (i.e., overcoming and conditioning singularities) exhibited to a 
far greater extent by the latter, than the former.22  Hence, CACFD indicate that the utilization of 
computational techniques can be based on principled reasons (i.e., the ability to characterize 
singular phenomena in ways that traditional experimental methodologies are too coarse-grained 
to meet the explanatory demands suggested by CFD), as opposed to merely practical (i.e., that 
such computational procedures better fit the bill-literally!-in terms of contingent resource 
allocation).  CACFD hence exhibit a new generative role in the field of fluid mechanics, by 
offering categories of experimental evidence that are optimally descriptive and explanatory—i.e., 
pace Batterman (2005) can be both ontologically and epistemically fundamental.   
Prior to introducing the work Mann & Rockwood and Scheuermann (in III.8 below), I 
make brief mention of some of the issues I discuss in a more detailed fashion in Kallfelz (2009b), 
bearing relevance to my claims concerning a tempered realist interpretation of these classes of 
simulations.  Aside from some of the arcane aspects thereof, the reader is welcome to skip these 
(relatively free standing) sections below (III.1-III.7), should the topic of realism motivate not 
prove itself to be a motivating factor. 
      
 
III.1: “Epistemic” and “Ontologically Fundamental” Aspects of Navier Stokes 
Simulations (Batterman (2005)).  
 
Robert Batterman (2005) distinguishes between “ontologically fundamental” and 
“epistemically fundamental” theories.  The aim of former is to “get the metaphysical nature of 
the systems right,” (19) often at the expense of being explanatorily inadequate.  Fundamentally 
explanatory issues involving the universal dynamical behavior of critical phenomena,23 for 
instance, cannot be accounted for by the ontologically fundamental theory.  The explanatory aim 
of epistemologically fundamental theories, on the other hand, is an account for such universal 
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including fluids undergoing phase transitions under certain conditions favorable for modeling their behavior using 
Renormalization Group methods, shock-wave propagation (phonons), caustic surfaces occurring under study in the 
field of catastrophe optics, quantum chaotic phenomena, etc., some of which I reviewed in Chapter 2 above.  
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behavior at the expense of suppressing (if not outright misrepresenting) a physical system’s 
fundamentally ontological features.   
In the case of critical phenomena such as droplet formation, even in cases of more fine-
grained resolutions of the scaling similarity solution for the Navier-Stokes equations (which 
approximate a fluid as a continuum), “we must appeal to the non-Humean similarity solution 
(resulting from the singularity) of the idealized continuum Navier-Stokes theory.” (20)  In a 
more general sense, though “nature abhors a singularity…without them one cannot characterize, 
describe, and explain the emergence of new universal phenomena at different scales.” (19)   
In other words, according to Batterman (2005) we need the ontologically “false” but 
epistemically fundamental theory to account for the ontologically true but epistemically lacking 
fundamental theory.  “[A] complete understanding (or at least an attempt) of the drop breakup 
problem requires essential use of a ‘nonfundamental’ [i.e. epistemically fundamental] 
theory…the continuum Navier-Stokes theory of fluid dynamics.” (18) 
Batterman advocates this necessary coexistence of two kinds of fundamental theories can 
be viewed as a refinement of his more general themes presented in (2002).  As I discussed in 
chapter 2 (Kallfelz (2009b)) he argues that in the case of emergent phenomena, explanation and 
reduction part company.  The superseded theory T can still play an essential role.  The 
superseding theory T /, though ‘deeply containing T ’ (in some non-reductive sense) cannot 
adequately account for emergent and critical phenomena alone, and thus enlists T in some 
essential manner.  This produces a rift between reduction and explanation, and one is forced to 
accommodate an admixture of differing ontologies characterized by the respectively superseding 
and superseded theories.  In his later work, Batterman (2005) seems to imply that 
epistemologically fundamental theories serve in a similarly necessary capacity in terms of what 
he explains the superseded theories do, in the case of emergent phenomena (2002). 
I have critiqued Batterman’s claims (2002, 2004) in my (2009b) in a two-fold manner: 
Batterman confuses a theory’s mathematical content with its ontological content.  This 
confusion, in turn, causes him to exaggerate the importance of certain notions of singularities in 
the explanatory role they play in the superseded theory.  I argue here that there exist methods of 
regularization in geometric algebraic characterizations of microphysical phenomena, which can 
provide a more reliable ontological account for what goes on at the microlevel level precisely 
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because they bypass singularities that would otherwise occur in more conventional mathematical 
techniques not based on geometric algebraic expansion and contraction. 
 
III.2 Methodological Fundamentalism 
 
I characterize such a notion of ‘fundamental’ arising in algebraic expansion and 
contraction techniques as an example of a methodological fundamentalism, which in principle 
can offers a means of intertheoretic reduction overcoming the singular cases Batterman discusses 
in (2002, 2004).  In the case of fluid dynamics, mulitilinear algebras like Clifford algebras have 
been recently applied by Gerik Scheuermann (2000), and Mann & Rockwood (2003) in their 
work on computational fluid dynamics (CFD).  The authors show that CFD methods  imply that 
methodological fundamentalism can, in the cases Batterman investigates, provisionally sort out 
and reconcile epistemically and ontologically fundamental theories.  Hence, pace Batterman, 
they need not act at cross purposes. 
Robert Batterman explains the motivation for presenting a distinction between 
ontological versus epistemically fundamental theories: 
I have tried to show that a complete understanding (or at least an attempt…) of the drop 
breakup problem requires essential use of a ‘nonfundamental’ theory…the continuum 
Navier Stokes theory of fluid dynamics…[But] how can a false (because idealized) 
theory such as continuum fluid dynamics be essential for understanding the behaviors of 
systems that fail completely to exhibit the principal feature of that idealized theory?  Such 
systems [after all] are discrete in nature and not continuous…I think the term 
‘fundamental theory’ is ambiguous…[An ontologically fundamental theory]…gets the 
metaphysical nature of the system right.  On the other hand…ontologically fundamental 
theories are often explanatorily inadequate.  Certain explanatory questions…about the 
emergence and reproducibility of patterns of behavior cannot be answered by the 
ontologically fundamental theory.  I think that this shows…there is an epistemological 
notion of ‘fundamental theory’ that fails to coincide with the ontological notion. (2005, 
18-19, italics added) 
 
On the other hand, epistemically fundamental theories aim at a more comprehensive explanatory 
account, often, however, at the price of introducing essential singularities.  For example, in the 
case of ‘universal classes’ of behavior of fluid-dynamical phenomena exhibiting patterns like 
droplet formation: 
Explanation of [such] universal patterns of behavior require means for eliminating details 
that ontologically distinguish the different systems exhibiting the same behavior.  Such 
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means are often provided by a blow-up or singularity in the epistemically more 
fundamental theory that is related to the ontologically fundamental theory by some limit. 
(ibid., italics added) 
 
 Obviously, any theory relying on a continuous topology24 harbors the possibility of 
exhibiting singular behavior, depending on its domain of application.25  In the case of droplet-
formation, for example, the (renormalized) solutions to the continuous Navier-Stokes Equations 
(NSE) exhibit singular behavior.  These singularities play an essentially explanatory role insofar 
as such solutions in the singular limit exhibit ‘self-similar,’ or universal behavior.26 Only one 
parameter essentially governs the behavior of solutions to the NSEs in such a singular limit.  
Specifically, only the fluid’s thickness parameter (neck radius h) governs the shape of the fluid 
near break-up,27 in the asymptotic solution to the NSE (2004, 15) 
Figure III.1 (Representation of the parameters governing droplet formation) 
        h(z/ ,t/) 
  













          z/= z- z0 




    (z0 , t0) 
z 
where: f(t/) is a continuous (dimensionless) function expressing the time-dependence of the 
solution (t/= t- t0 is the measured time after droplet breakup t0). 
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 In chapter 2 (Kallfelz 2009b), I borrow Bishop’s (2002) usage, in which he distinguishes the ontology, i.e. the 
primitive entities stipulated by a physical theory, from its topology, or structure of its mathematical formalism. 
25
 This is of course due to the rich structure of continuous sets themselves admitting such effects.  Consider, for 
example, the paradigmatic example: f ∈(-∞, ∞)(-∞, ∞)  given by the rule:  f(x) = 1/x . This obviously produces an 
essential singularity at x = 0.  
26
 “Batterman suggests that the similarities in behavior [i.e., the universality] may be explained as a consequence of 
the fact that the differences in realization at the physical level are irrelevant to the higher-order behavior, in the same 
way that the differences between diverse systems underlying phase transitions are irrelevant to the behavior near the 
critical temperature.” (Strevens 2002, 655) 
27
 For fluids of low viscosities see Batterman (2004), n 12, p.16. 
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 α ,β are phenomenological constants to be determined. H is a Haenkel function.28 
 
One could understand the epistemically and ontologically fundamental theories as playing 
analogous roles to Batterman’s (2002, 2003, 2004) previously characterized superseded and 
superseding theories (T and T /, respectively).  Analogous to the case of the superseded theory T, 
the epistemically fundamental theory offers crucial explanatory insight, at the expense of 
mischaracterizing the underlying ontology of the phenomena under study.  Whereas, on the other 
hand, analogous to the case of the superseding theory T /, the ontologically fundamental theory 
gives a more representative metaphysical characterization, at the expense of losing its 
explanatory efficacy.   
For instance, in the case of the breaking water droplet, the ontologically fundamental theory 
would be the molecular-discrete one.  But aside from practical limitations posed by the sheer 
intractability of the computational complexity of such a quantitative account, the discrete-
molecular theory, precisely because it lacks the singular-asymptotic aspect, cannot depict the 
(relatively) universal character presented in the asymptotic limit of the (renormalized) solutions 
to the NSE.   
However, I argue here that there are theoretical characterizations whose formalisms can 
regularize or remove singularities from some of the fluid-dynamical behavior in a sufficiently 
abstract and general manner, as to call into question the presumably essential distinctions 
between epistemological and ontological fundamentalism.  I call such formal approaches 
“methodologically fundamental,”29  because of the general strategy such approaches introduce, 
in terms of offering a regularizing procedure.  Adopting such methodologically fundamental 
procedures, whenever it is possible to do so,30 suggests that Batterman’s distinctions may not be 
different theoretical kinds, but function at best as different aspects of a unified methodological 
strategy.  This calls into question the explanatory pluralism Batterman appears to be advocating. 
 
III.3: Belot’s Critiques Revisited 
 
                                               
28
 I.e. belonging to a class of orthonormal special functions often appearing in solutions to PDEs describing 
dynamics of boundary-value problems. 
29
 Recall my specification mentioned in n. 5 above. 
30




Gordon Belot’s (2003) criticism of Batterman (2002) consists of indicating that a more 
mathematically rigorous rendition of the superseding theory T / presumably eliminates the 
necessity of having to resort simultaneously to the superseded theory T to characterize some 
critical phenomenon (or class of phenomena) Φ.  Like Belot, I also claim that geometric 
algebraic techniques abound which can regularize the singularities appearing in formalisms of T  
(or T / ).  Conversely, when representing such critical phenomena Φ, singularities can occur in T  
(or T / ) when the latter are characterized by the more typically standard field-theoretic or phase 
space methods alone.     
However, the mathematical content of the techniques I investigate differs significantly from 
those discussed by Belot (2003), who characterizes T / using the more general and abstract theory 
of partial differential equations on differentiable manifolds.  He demonstrates that in principle, 
all of the necessary features of critical phenomena Φ can be so depicted by the mathematical 
formalism of superseding theory T /  alone (2003, 23).  Because the manifold structure is 
continuous, this can admit the possibility of depicting such critical phenomena Φ through 
complex and asymptotic singular behavior.  In other words, Belot is not fundamentally 
questioning the underlying theoretical topologies typically associated with T and T /.31   Instead, 
he is questioning the need to bring the two different ontologies of the superseded and 
superseding theories together, to adequately account for Φ.  Belot is questioning the presumed 
ontological pluralism that Batterman advanced in his notion of an ‘asymptotic explanation’.     
Batterman responds:  
I suspect that one intuition behind Belot’s …objection is…I [appear to be] saying that for 
genuine explanation we need [to] appeal essentially to an idealization [i.e., the ontology 
of the superseded theory T.]  …In speaking of this idealization as essential for 
explanation, they take me to be reifying [T’s ontology]…It is this last claim only that I 
reject.  I believe that in many instances our explanatory physical practice demands that 
we appeal essentially to (infinite) idealizations.  But I don’t believe that this involves the 
reification of the idealized structures.” (2003, 7) 
 
It is, of course, precisely the latter claim “that we appeal essentially to (infinite) 
idealizations” that I take issue with here, according to what the regularization procedures 
indicate.   Batterman, however, cryptically and subsequently remarks that: “In arguing that an 
account that appeals to the mathematical idealization is superior to a theory that does not invoke 
                                               
31
 I.e., differential equations on phase space, characterizable through the theory of differential manifolds. 
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the idealizations, I am not reifying the mathematics…I am claiming that the ‘fundamental’ 
theory that fails to take seriously the idealized [asymptotic] ‘boundary’ is less explanatorily 
adequate.” (8)  In short, it seems that in his overarching emphasis in what he considers to be 
novel accounts of scientific explanation (namely, of the asymptotic variety) he often blurs the 
distinctions, and shifts emphasis between a theory’s ontology and its topology.  It is precisely 
this sort of equivocation, as I discussed in chapter 2 above, that causes him to inadvertently 
uphold mathematical notions like “infinite idealizations” as acting like some explanatory 
standard.  To put it another way, since it is safe to assume that the actual critical phenomena 
Batterman discusses are ultimately metaphysically finite, precisely how can one ‘appeal 
essentially to (infinite) idealizations’ without inadvertently ‘reifying the mathematics?’ 
I, on the other hand, pace Belot (2003) and Batterman (2002-2005) present an alternative to 
the mathematical formalisms that both authors appeal to, which rely so centrally on continuous 
topological structures.32  I show how discretely graded, and ultimately finite-dimensional multi-
linear geometric (Clifford) algebras can provide accounts for some of the same critical 
phenomena Φ in a regularizable or a singularity-free fashion.   
 
III.4: Disclaimer Concerning the General Applicability of Clifford Algebra in 
Characterizing Critical Phenomena 
 
Prior to describing the specific details of how to implement the strategy in the case of critical 
phenomena exhibited in fluid dynamics, however, I make the following disclaimer:  I am 
definitely not arguing that the discrete, graded, multilinear Clifford-algebraic methods share such 
a degree of universal applicability that they should supplant the continuous, phase-space, 
infinite-dimensional differentiable manifold structure constituting the general formalism of the 
theory of differential equations, whether ordinary or partial.  Nor do I have to make a general 
claim here in this chapter, but merely offer a counterexample for the case of the critical 
phenomenon of breaking droplets that Batterman (2005) analyzes.  Research in geometric 
algebra is ongoing and burgeoning, both in the fields of fundamental as well as in applied 
physics. (Baugh et. al. (2003), Baylis (1995), Bolinder (1987), Conte (1993-2000), Finkelstein 
                                               
32
 Of course, in the case of Batterman, continuous structures comprise as well the ontology of the epistemically 
fundamental theory: Navier-Stokes treats fluids as continua.  In the case of Belot, the theory of partial differential 
equations he presents relies fundamentally on continuous, differentiable manifolds, characterizing the “formal 
ontology” of the theory of fluid mechanics (to use Rohrlich’s notions, as discussed in I.2 above).    
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(1999-2004), Gallier (2005), Hestenes (1984, 1986), Khrenikov (2005), Lansenby, et. al. (2000), 
Levine & Dannon (2000), Mann et. al. (2003), Nebe (1999, 2000), Scheuermann (2000), Sloane 
(2001), Snygg (1997), Van den Nest, et. al. (2005), Vlasov (2000)). All the authors listed above 
(who comprise just a miniscule sample of the enormous body of literature on the subject of 
applications of Clifford Algebra in physics and engineering) either describe the mathematical 
formalism as especially appealing, due to its providing a ‘unifying language’ in the field of 
mathematical physics33, or apply the formalism in key instances to make some interpretative 
point in the foundations of quantum theory, no matter how specific34 or general.35  
Certainly the empirical content of a specific problem domain determines which is the ‘best’ 
mathematical structure to implement in any theory of mathematical physics.  By and large, such 
criteria are often determined essentially by practical limitations of computational complexity.   
No danger of the aforementioned sort of equivocation that Batterman seems to commit, as I 
have argued above, is encountered so long as one can carefully distinguish the epistemological, 
ontological, and methodological issues vis-à-vis our choice of mathematical formalism(s) (i.e. 
distinguishing aspects E,O, M. as discussed in chapter 1, Kallfelz 2009b).  If the choice is 
primarily motivated by practical issues of computational facility, we can hopefully resist the 
temptation to reify our mathematical maneuvering, which would confuse the ‘approximate’ with 
the ‘fundamental’— let alone confusing ontological, epistemological, and methodological senses 
of the latter notion.36  Even Batterman admits that “nature abhors singularities.” (2005, 20)  So, I 
argue, should we.  The entire paradigm behind regularization procedures is driven by the notion 
that a singularity, far from being an “infinite idealization we must appeal to” (Batterman 2003, 
7), is a signal that the underlying formalism of theory is the pathological cause, resulting in the 
theory’s failure to provide reliable information in certain critical cases.   
Far from conceding to some class of “asymptotic-explanations,” lending a picture of the 
world of critical phenomena as somehow carved at the joints of asymptotic singularities, we 
must instead search for regularizable procedures.  This is precisely why such an approach is 
                                               
33
 E.g., Finkelstein, Hestenes, Lasenby 
34
 E.g., Conte, Hogreve, Snygg 
35
 E.g., Hiley, Khrenikov, Vlasov 
36
 I am, of course, not saying that there does not exist any connection whatsoever between a theory’s computational 
efficacy and its ability to represent certain fundamentally ontological features of the phenomena of interest.  What 
that connection ultimately is (whether empirical, or some complex and indirect logical blend thereof) I remain an 
agnostic.  I do not take simplicity as evidence of a high degree of verisimilitude, in a manner similar to van 
Fraassen’s (1980) “agnosticism” concerning the correct evidential consequences of a theory and its “truth.” 
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methodologically fundamental: regularization implies some (weak) form of intertheoretic 
reduction, as I shall argue below.   
 
III.5: Some Proposed Necessary Conditions for a Methodologically Fundamental 
Procedure 
 
 In this section, I summarize aspects of methods incorporating algebraic structures 
frequently used in mathematical physics, leading up to and including the regularization 
procedures latent in applications of Clifford Algebras.  Because this material involves some 
technical notions of varying degrees of specialty, I have provided for the interested reader an 
Appendix at the end of this essay supplying all the necessary definitions and brief explanations 
thereon.  
I review here a few basic techniques involving (abstract algebraic) expansion and 
contraction. Consider the situation in which the superceding theory T / is capable of being 
characterized, in principle, by an algebra.37  Algebraic expansion denotes the process of 
extending out from algebraically characterized T ′  to some *T ′  (denoted: *TT ′→′ λ ) where λ 
is some fundamental parameter characterizing the algebraic expansion.  The inverse procedure: 
TT ′=′→ *lim 0λ  is contraction.   
The question becomes: how to regularize?  In other words, which *T ′  should one choose to 
guarantee a regular (i.e., non-singular) limit for any λ  in the greatest possible generality?   
Answer: expanding into an algebraic structure whose relativity group, i.e., the group of all its 
dynamical symmetries,38 is simple implies that the Lie algebra depicting its infinitesimal 
transformations is stable.39  This in turn entails greater reciprocity,40 i.e., “reciprocal couplings in 
                                               
37
 That is to say, a vector space with an associative product.  For further details, see Appendix A.2 below.  
38
 Recall the discussion in chapter 2, §4 above.  In other words, the group of all actions in leaving their form of 
dynamical laws invariant (in the active view) or the group of all ‘coordinate transformations’ preserving the tensor 
character of the dynamical laws (in the ‘passive view.’)  Also, see Defn. A.2.2 in Appendix A.2 below for a 
description of simple groups. 
39
 For a brief description of stable Lie algebras, see the discussion following Defn A.2.4, section A.2, Appedix.  
40
 For example, in the case of the Lorenz group, which is simple, it is maximally reciprocal in terms of its 
fundamental parameters x, and t.  That is to say, the form of Lorenz transformations (simplified in one dimensional 
motion along the x-axes of the inertial frame F and F’ ) become x’ = x’(x,t) = γ(x – Vt) and t’ = t’(x,t) = γ(t – Vx/c2) 
(where γ = (1-V2/c2)-1/2 ).   Hence both space x and time t couple when transforming between inertial frames F, F’, as 
their respective transformations involve each other.  On the other hand, the Galilean group is not simple, as it 
contains an invariant subgroup of boosts.  The Galilean transformations are not maximally reciprocal, as x’ = x’(x,t) 
= x - Vt but t’ = t.  x is a cyclic coordinate with respect to transformation t’. Thus, when transforming between 
frames, x couples with respect to t but not vice versa.   
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the theory…reactions for every action.” (Finkelstein, 2002,10, Baugh, et. al., 2003).  This is an 
instance of a methodologically fundamental procedure, which I summarize by the following 
general necessary conditions: 
• Ansatz Ia: If a procedure P for formulating a theory T  in mathematical physics is 
methodologically fundamental, then there exists some algebraically characterized 
expansion *T ′   of T’s algebraic characterization (denoted by T /) and some expansion 
parameter λ such that:  *TT ′→′ λ .  Then, trivially, *T ′  is regularizable with respect 
to T / since TT ′=′→ *lim 0λ   is well-defined (via the inverse procedure of algebraic 
contraction).  
• Ansatz Ib: If  *T ′  is an expansion of T /, then *T ′ ’s relativity group is simple, which 
results in a stable Lie algebra d *T ′ , and whose set of observables in *T ′  is maximally 
reciprocal.  
 
The Segal Doctrine (Baugh, et. al. 2003) described any algebraic formalization of a theory 
obeying what I depict above, according to Ansatz Ib, as “fundamental.”  I insert here the 
adjective “methodological,” since such a procedure comprises a method of regularization 
(viewed from the standpoint of the ‘inverse’ procedure of contraction) and so provides a formal, 
methodological means of reducing a superseding theory T/ into its superseded theory T, when 
characterized by algebras.   
In the following subsection, I summarize in detail how such a methodologically fundamental 
procedure, characterized by the Ansaetze above, has been developed by Baugh (2003), 
Finkelstein (2001-2004a) and Shiri-Garakhani (2004b) as a means to derive continuous 
structures, encountered in general relativity, from this discrete geometrical algebraic basis.  
Because of the specificity and technicality of some of the details, the reader may skip this section 
without loss of any of the conceptual insights presented in this chapter.  I nevertheless present 
the section below as part of the chapter, rather than as a separate section to the Appendix below, 
to illustrate to the interested reader in a concrete fashion some of the successful developments of 
Clifford algebraic methods in some of the most daunting areas of theoretical physics involving 
the complex interplay between discrete-based and continuum-based theories as constitutive of 
quantum topology.  Such applications in my opinion reinforce the claims made by numerous 
researchers regarding the promise of such method, in its specifically robust regularizability 
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which presents itself as a viable alternative to the more common continuum-based methods 
typically constitutive of field theory (whether quantum or classical).41   
 
III.6: Example: Deriving a (Continuous) Field Theory from a Discrete Graded Clifford 
Representation. 
 
Baugh, et. al. (2003), Finkelstein (1996, 2001, 2004a-c) presents a unification of field 
theories (quantum and classical) and space-time theory based fundamentally on finite 
dimensional Clifford algebraic structures.  The regularization procedure fundamentally involves 
group-theoretic simplification.  The choice of the Clifford algebra42 is motivated by two 
fundamental reasons: 
1. The typically abstract (adjoint-based) algebraic characterizations of quantum dynamics 
(whether C*, Heisenberg, etc.) represents how actions can be combined (in series, 
parallel, or reversed) but omits space-time fine structure.43  On the other hand, a 
Clifford algebra can express a quantum space-time. (2001, 5)    
2. Clifford statistics44 for chronons adequately expresses the distinguishability of events 
as well as the existence of half-integer spin. (2001, 7) 
 
The first reason entails that the prime variable is not the space-time field, as Einstein 
stipulated, but rather the dynamical law.  That is to say, “the dynamical law [is] the only 
dependent variable, on which all others depend.” (2001, 6)  The “atomic” quantum dynamical 
unit (represented by a generator αγ  of a Clifford algebra) is the chronon χ, with the closest 
classical analogue being the tangent or cotangent vector (forming an 8-dimensional manifold) 
and not the space-time point (forming a 4-dimensional manifold).    
Applying Clifford statistics to dynamics is achieved via the (category) functors45 ENDO, 
SQ which map the mode space46 Χ of the chronon χ, to its operator algebra (the algebra of 
                                               
41
 Of which renormalization group methods are the most notorious, as I explain in Kallfelz 2005a. 
42
 The associated multiplicative groups embedded in Clifford algebras obey the simplicity criterion (Ansatz Ib, 
subsection 1 above).  Hence Clifford algebras (or geometric algebras) remain an attractive candidate for 
algebraicizing any theory in mathematical physics (assuming the Clifford product and sum can be appropriately 
operationally interpreted in the theory T). For definitions and further discussion thereon, see Defn A.2.5, Appendix 
A.2. 
43
 The space-time structure must are supplied by classical structures, prior to the definition of the dynamical algebra. 
(2001, 5) 
44
 I.e., the simplest statistics supporting a 2-valued representation of  SN, the symmetry group on N objects. 
45
 See Defn. A.1.2, Appendix A.1 
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endomorphisms47 A on X) and to its spinor space S (the statistical composite of all chronons 
transpiring in some experimental region.) (2001, 10).  The action of  ENDO, SQ producing the 
Clifford algebra CLIFF, representing the global dynamics of the chronon ensemble is depicted in 
the following commutative diagram: 
 
   ENDO 
X   A = ENDO(X) 
    SQ        SQ   
   S ENDO  CLIFF   
Fig. 3.2: Commutative diagram representing the action of deriving a statistics of quantum 
spacetime based on Clifford algebra  
 
  
 Analogous to H.S. Green’s (2000) embedding of space-time geometry into a 
paraferminionic algebra of qubits, Finkelstein shows that a Clifford statistical ensemble of 
chronons can factor as a Maxwell-Boltzmann ensemble of Clifford subalgebras.  This in turn 
becomes a Bose-Einstein aggregate in the N → ∞ limit (where N is the number of factors).  This 
Bose-Einstein aggregate condenses into an 8-dimensional manifold M, which is isomorphic to 
the tangent bundle of space-time.  Moreover, M is a Clifford manifold, i.e. a manifold provided 
with a Clifford ring: ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )MCMCMCMC N⊕⊕⊕= K10  (where: C0(M), C1(M),…,CN(M) 
represent the scalars, vectors,…, N-vectors on the manifold).  For any tangent vectors γµ(x),  γν(x) 
on (Lie algebra dM) then: 
         γµ(x) ° γν(x) = gµν(x)     
where: °  is the scalar product. (2004a, 43)  Hence the space-time manifold is a singular limit of 
the Clifford algebra representing the global dynamics of chronons in an experimental region. 
                                                                                                                                                       
46
 The mode space is a kinematic notion, describing the set of all possible modes for a chronon χ, the way a state 
space describe the set of all possible states for a state ϕ in ordinary quantum mechanics. 
47
 I.e, the set of surjective (onto) algebraic structure-preserving maps (those preserving the action of the algebraic 
‘product’ or ‘sum’ between two algebras A, A’).  In other words, Φ is an endomorphism on X, i.e. Φ: X → X  iff: ∀ 
x,y∈ X: Φ(x+y) = Φ(x)+ Φ(y), where + is vector addition.  Furthermore Φ(X) =X: i.e. for any z ∈ X: ∃ x ∈ X such 
that Φ(x) = y.  For a more general discussion on the abstract algebraic notions, see A.2, Appendix. 
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 Observable consequences of the theory are discussed in the model of the oscillator 
(2004c).  Since the dynamical oscillator undergirds much of the framework of contemporary 
quantum theory, especially quantum field theory, the (generalized) model oscillator constructed 
via group simplification and regularization is isomorphic to a dipole rotator in the orthogonal 
group O(6N) (where: N = l(l + 1) >> 1).  In other words, a finite quantum mechanical oscillator 
results, bypassing the ultraviolet and infrared divergences that occur in the case of the standard 
(infinite dimensional) oscillator applied to quantum field theory.  In place of these divergences 
are “soft” and “hard” cases, respectively representing maximum potential energy unable to excite 
one quantum of momentum, and maximum kinetic energy being unable to excite one quantum of 
position.  “These [cases]…resemble [and] extend the original ones by which Planck obtained a 
finite thermal distribution of cavity radiation.  Even the 0-point energy of a similarly regularized 
field theory will be finite, and can therefore be physical.” (2004c, 12)   
In addition, such potentially observable extreme cases modify high and low energy 
physics, as “the simplest regularization leads to interactions between the previously uncoupled 
excitation quanta of the oscillator…strongly attractive for soft or hard quanta.” (2004c, 19)  
Since the oscillator model quantizes and unifies time, energy, space, and momentum, on the 
scale of the Planck power (1051 W), time and energy can be interconverted.48  
III.7:  What Makes Multilinear Algebraic Expansion Methodologically Fundamental. 
 
Before turning to the example involving applying Clifford algebraic characterization of 
critical phenomena in fluid mechanics, I shall give a final and brief recapitulation concerning the 
reasons why one should consider such methods described here as methodologically fundamental.  
For starters, the previous two Ansatze that I have proposed (in subsection 1 above) act as 
necessary conditions for what may constitute a methodologically fundamental procedure.  
Phrasing them in their contrapositive form (I.a*, I.b* below) also tell us what formalization 
                                               
48
 In such extreme cases, equipartition and Heisenberg Uncertainty is violated.  The uncertainty relation for 
the soft and hard oscillators read, respectively:  
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schemes for theories in mathematical physics cannot be considered methodologically 
fundamental: 
• Ansatz (Ia*): If *T ′  is singular with respect to T / , in the sense that the behavior of  
*T ′  in the λ → 0 limit does not converge to the theory T / at the λ = 0 limit (for any such 
contraction parameter λ), this entails that the procedure P for formulating a theory T  in 
mathematical physics cannot be methodologically fundamental, and is therefore 
methodologically approximate. 
• Ansatz (Ib*): If the relativity group of *T ′  is not simple, its Lie algebra is subsequently 
unstable.  Therefore *T ′  cannot act as an effective algebraic expansion of T/  in the 
sense of guaranteeing that the inverse contraction procedure is non-singular.   
. 
Certainly Ansatz Ia* is just a re-statement (in algebraic terms) of Batterman’s more 
general discussion (2002) of critical phenomena, evincing in his case-studies a singularity or 
inability for the superseding theory to reduce to the superseded theory.  However this need not 
entail that we must preserve a notion of ‘asymptotic explanations,’ as Batterman would invite us 
to do, which would somehow inextricably involve the superseded and the superseding theories.  
Instead, as Ansatz I.a* states, this simply tells us that the mathematical scheme of the respective 
theory (or theories) is not methodologically fundamental, so we have a signal to search for 
methodologically fundamental procedures in the particular problem-domain, if they exist.49 
Ansatz I.b* gives us further insight into criteria filtering out methodologically 
fundamental procedures.  Finkelstein, et. al. (2001) demonstrate that all field theories exhibit, at 
root, an underlying fiber-bundle topology50 and cannot have any relativity groups that are 
simple.  This excludes a vast class of mathematical formalisms: all-field theoretic formalisms, 
whether classical or quantum.   
However, as informally discussed in the preceding section, if any class of mathematical 
formalisms is methodologically approximate, this would not in itself entail that the 
computational efficacy or empirical adequacy of any theory T constituted by such a class is 
somehow diminished.  If a formalism is found to be methodologically approximate, this should 
                                               
49
 In a practical sense, of course, the existence of procedures entail staying within the strict bounds determined by 
what is computationally feasible. 
50
 I.e., for Hausdorf (separable) spaces X, B, F, and map p: X →B, defined as a bundle projection (with fiber F) if 
there exists a homeomorphism (topologically continuous map) defined on every neighborhood U for any point b∈B 
such that: φ : p(φ<b,f>) = b for any f ∈F.  On p-1(U) = {x∈X | p(x) ∈ U}, then p acts as a projection map on U×F 
→F.  A fiber bundle consists is described by B×F , (subject to other topological constraints (Brendon (2000), 106-
107)) where B acts as the set of base points {b| b∈B ⊆ X } and F the associated fibres   p-1(b) = {x∈X | p(x) = b} at 
each b.     
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simply act as a caveat against laying excessive emphasis on the theory’s ontology, until such a 
theory can be characterized by a methodologically fundamental procedure.  
A methodologically fundamental strategy does more than simply remove undesirable 
singularities.  As discussed above in subsection 1, the finite number of degrees of freedom 
(represented by the maximum grade N of the particular Clifford algebra) positively informs 
certain ontologically fundamental notions regarding our metaphysical intuitions concerning the 
ultimately discrete characteristics of the entities fundamentally constituting the phenomenon of 
interest.51  On the other hand, the regularization techniques have, pace Batterman, epistemically 
fundamental consequences that are positive. 
In closing, one can ask how likely is it that methodologically fundamental multilinear 
algebraic strategies can be applied to any complex phenomena under study, such as critical 
behavior?  The serious questions deal with practical limitations of computational complexity: 
asymptotic methods can yield simple and elegantly powerful results, which would undoubtedly 
otherwise prove far more laborious to establish by discrete multilinear structures, no matter how 
methodologically fundamental the latter turn out to be.  Nevertheless, the ever-burgeoning field 
of computational physics gives us an extra degree of freedom to handle, to a certain extent, the 
risk of combinatorial explosion that such multilinear algebraic techniques may present, when 
applied to a given domain of complex phenomena.52  I examine one case below, regarding the 
utilization of Clifford algebraic techniques in computational fluid dynamics (CFD), in modeling 
critical phenomena.    
 
III.8 Summary of CACFD  
 
Gerik Scheuermann (2000), as well as Mann & Rockwood (2003), employ Clifford 
algebras to develop topological vector field visualizations of critical phenomena in fluid 
                                               
51
 Recall the discussion of ontological levels in I.3, I. 4 above.  This is relative, of course, to the level of scale we 
wish to begin, in terms of characterizing the theories’ ontological primitives.  For instance, should one wish to begin 
at the level of quarks, the question of whether or not their fundamental properties are discrete or continuous becomes 
a murky issue.  Though quantum mechanics is often understood as a fundamentally ‘discrete’ theory, the continuum 
nevertheless appears in a subtle manner, when considering entangled modes, which are based on particular 
superpositions of ‘non-factorizable’ products. 
52
 To be precise, so long as the algorithms implementing such multilinear algebraic procedures are ‘polytime,’ i.e. 
grow in polynomial complexity, over time. 
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mechanics.  Visualizations and CFD simulations form a respectable and epistemically robust 
way of characterizing critical phenomena, down to the nanoscale. (Lenhard (2004)) “The goal is 
not theory-based insight as it is [typically] elaborated in the philosophical literature about 
scientific explanation.  Rather, the goal is [for instance] to find stable design-rules that might 
even be sufficient to build a stable nano-device.” (2004, 99, italics added)  Simulations offer 
potential for intervention, challenging the “received criteria for what may count as adequate 
quantitative understanding.” (ibid.)   
Thus, Lenhard’s above remarks appear as a rather strong endorsement for an 
epistemically fundamental procedure: The heuristics of CFD-based phenomenogical approaches 
lend a quasi-empirical character to this kind of research.53  CFD techniques can produce robust 
characterizations of critical phenomena where traditional, ‘[Navier-Stokes] theory-based 
insights’ often cannot.  Moreover, aside from their explanatory power, CFD visualizations can 
present more accurate depictions of what occurs at the microlevel, insofar as the numerical and 
modeling algorithms can support a more detailed depiction of dynamical processes occurring on 
the microlevel.  Hence there appears to be no inherent tension here: Clifford-algebraic CFD 
procedures are epistemically as well ontologically fundamental.54  Of course, I claim that what 
                                               
53
 The topic of computer simulations has received recent philosophical attention. Eric Winsberg (2003) makes the 
case that they enjoy ‘a life of their own’ (124) between the categories of activity such as theory-articulation on the 
one end, and laboratory experiments on the other.  “[B]y the semiautonomy of a simulation model, one refers to the 
fact that it starts from theory but one modifies it with extensive approximations, idealizations, falsifications, 
auxiliary information, and the blood, sweat, and tears of much trial and error.” (109)  In other words, stated 
negatively, the simulation cannot be derived in any straightforward algorithmic procedure from its ‘parent’ theory.  
Stated positively, simulation activity inevitably involves an essential aspect of abductive reasoning.  Though by the 
same token, argues Winsberg, to conflate computer simulation activity with standard laboratory activity would be to 
confuse paintings with mirrors, as being equally representative of human posture (borrowing from Wittgenstein’s 
analogy used in a critique of Ramsey’s theory of identity). (116) 
 
If in our analysis of simulation we take it to be a method that essentially begins with an algorithm 
antecedently taken to accurately mimic the system in question, then the question has been begged as to 
whether and how simulations can, and often do, provide us with genuinely new, previously unknown 
knowledge about the system being simulated.  It would be as mysterious as if we could use portraits in 
order to learn new facts about the postures of our bodies in the way that Wittgenstein describes. (ibid.) 
 
A fuller account of Clifford-algebraic CFD methods in the light of some of the recent philosophical work on 
computer simulations is a topic clearly worthy of another study, above and beyond the scope of this essay.  I briefly 
remark on such implications in chapter 4 below.     
54
 Which is not to say, of course, that the applications of Clifford algebras in CFD contain no inherent tensions.  The 
trade-off, or tension, however, is of a practical nature: that between computational complexity and accurate 
representation of  microlevel details.  Lest this appears as though playing into the hands of Batterman’s 
epistemically versus ontologically ‘fundamental’ distinctions, it is important to keep in mind that the trade-off is one 
of a practical and contingent issue involving computational resources.  Indeed, in the ideal limit of unconstrained 
computational power and resources, the trade-off disappears: one can model the underlying microlevel phenomena 
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guarantees this reconciliation is precisely the underlying methodologically fundamental feature 
of applying Clifford algebras in these instances. 
III.8.a: An Overview of Scheuermann’s Results  
 
Scheuermann, Mann & Rockwood are primarily motivated by the practical aim of achieving 
accurately representative (i.e. ontologically fundamental) CFD models of fluid singularities 
giving equally reliable (i.e. epistemically fundamental) predictions and visualizations covering 
all sorts of states of affairs.    
For example, Scheuermann (2000) points out that standard topological methods in CFD, 
using bilinear and piecewise linear interpolation approximating solutions to the Navier-Stokes 
equation, fail to detect critical points or regions of higher order (i.e. order greater than 1).  To 
spell this out, the following definitions are needed: 
Definition 1 (Vector Field):  A 2D or 3D vector field is a continuous function  
V: M → Rn where M is a manifold55 M ⊆ Rn, where n = 2 or 3 (for the 2Dand 3D cases, 
respectively) and Rn= R×.(n times).. ×R = {(x1,…, xn| xk ∈ R,1 ≤ k ≤ n}, i.e. n-dimensional 
Euclidean space (where n = 2 or 3.)56  
Definition 2 (Critical points/region):  A critical point57 xc ∈ M⊆ Rn or region 
U ⊆ M ⊆ Rn for the vector field V is one in which ||V(xc)|| = 0 or ||V(x)|| = 0   
∀x∈ U, respectively.58    
 
                                                                                                                                                       
to an arbitrary degree of accuracy.  On the other hand, Batterman seems to be arguing that some philosophically 
important explanatory distinction exists between ontological and epistemic fundamentalism.  
55
 A manifold (2D or 3D) is a Hausdorff (i.e. simply connected) space in which each neighborhood of each one of its 
points is homeomorphic (topologically continuous) with a region in the plane R2 or space R3 , respectively.  For more 
information concerning topological spaces, see Table A.1.1, Appendix A.1. 
56
 I retain the characterization above to indicate that higher-dimensional generalizations are applicable.  In fact, one 
of the chief advantages of the Clifford algebraic formulations is their automatic applicability and generalization to 
higher-dimensional spaces.  This is in contrast to notions prevalent in vector algebra, in which some notions, like the 
case of the cross-product, are only definable for spaces of maximum dimension 3.  See A.2 for further details.    
57
 For simplicity, as long as no ambiguity appears, a point x in an n –dimensional manifold is depicted in the same 
manner as that of a scalar quantity x.  However, it’s important to keep in mind that x in the former case refers to an n 
–dimensional position vector. 
58
 Note: || || is simply the Euclidean norm.  In the case of a 2D vector field, for example, ||V(x,y)|| =  
||u(x,y)i + v(x,y)j|| = [u2(x,y) + v2(x,y)]1/2, where u and v are x and  y are the x,y components of V , described as 
continuous functions, and i, j are orthonormal vectors parallel to the x and y axis, respectively. 
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A higher-order critical point (or family of points) may signal, for instance, the presence of a 
saddle point (or suddle curve) in the case of the vector field being a gradient field of a scalar 
potential Φ(x) in R2(or 3), i.e. V(x) = ∇Φ(x).  “Higher-order critical points cannot exist in 
piecewise linear or bilinear interpolations.  This thesis presents an algorithm based on a new 
theoretical relation between analytical field description in Clifford Algebra and topology.” 
(Scheuermann (2000), 1)   
The essence of Scheuermann’s approach, of which he works out in detail examples in R2 and 
its associated Clifford Algebra CL(R2) of maximal grade N = dimR2 = 2 consisting of 22 = 4 
fundamental generators,59 involves constructing in CL(R2) a coordinate-independent differential 
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 are the directional derivatives 
of V with respect to gk.  For example, if g1, g2 are orthonormal vectors ( )21 ˆ,ˆ ee , then: ∂V = (∇•V)1 
+ (∇∧V)i , where 1, and i are the respective identity and unit pseudoscalars of CL(R2). 60  For 
example, in the matrix algebra M2(R), i.e. the algebra of real-valued 2x2 matrices: 
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Armed with this analytical notion of a coordinate-free differential operator, as well as 
adopting conformal mappings from R2 into the space of Complex numbers (which the latter form 
a grade-1 Clifford algebra) Scheuermann develops a topological algorithm obtaining estimates 
for higher-order critical points as well as determining more efficient routines: 
 
We can simplify the structure of the vector field and simplify the analysis by the scientist and 
engineer…some topological features may be missed by a piecewise linear interpolation [i.e., 
in the standard approach].  This problem is successfully attacked by using locally higher-
order polynomial approximations [of the vector field, using conformal maps]…[which] are 
based on the possible local topological structure of the vector field and the results of 
analyzing plane vector fields by Clifford algebra and analysis. (ibid (2000), 7) 
 
                                               
59
 For details concerning these features of Clifford algebras, see Defn A.2.5 and the brief ensuing discussions in A.2 
60
 compare this expression with the Clifford product in Defn A.2.5, A.2 
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III.8.b: An Overview of Mann and Rockwood’s Results 
 
Mann and Rockwood (2003) show how adopting Clifford algebras greatly simplifies the 
procedure for calculating the index (or order) of critical points or curves in a 2D or 3D vector 
field.  Normally (without Clifford algebra) the index is presented in terms of an unwieldy 
integral formula involving the necessity of evaluating normal curvature around a closed contour, 
as well the differential of an even more difficult term, known as the Gauss map, which acts as the 
measure of integration.  In short, even obtaining a rough numerical estimate for the index using 
standard vector calculus and differential geometry is a computationally costly procedure.   
On the other hand, the index formula takes on a far more elegant form when characterized in 
a Clifford algebra: 







= ∫          (IV.1) 
where: n = dimRn (where n = 2 or 3) 
 xc : a critical point, or point in a critical region.  
 C :a normalization constant. 
 I : the unit pseudoscalar of CL(Rn). 
 ∧ : the exterior (Grassmann) product.61  
 
The authors present various relatively straightforward algorithms for calculating the index of 
critical points using (IV.1) above.  “[W]e found the use of Clifford algebra to be a 
straightforward blueprint in coding the algorithm…the…computations of Geometric [Clifford] 
algebra automatically handle some of the geometric details…simplifying the programming job.” 
(ibid., 6) 
 The most significant geometric details here of course involve critical surfaces arising in 
droplet-formation, which produce singularities in the standard Navier-Stokes continuum-based 
theory.  Though Mann and Rockwood (2003) do not handle the problem of modeling droplet-
formation using Clifford-algebraic CFD per se, they do present an algorithm for the computation 
of surface singularities: 
                                               
61
 For definitions and brief discussions of these terms, see DefnA.2.5, A.2 
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To compute a surface singularity, we essentially use the same idea as for computing 
curve singularities…though the test for whether a surface singularity passes through the 
edge [of an idealized test cube used as the basis of ‘octree’ iterative algorithm, i.e. the 3D 
equivalent of a dichotomization procedure using squares that tile a plane] is simpler than 
in the case of curve singularities.  No outer products are needed—if the projected vectors 
along an edge [of the cube] change orientation/sign, then there is a [surface] singularity in 
the projected vector field. (ibid., 4) 
 
III.8.c: Assessment of Some Strengths and Shortcomings in the Approaches 
 
Shortcomings, however, include the procedure’s inability to determine the index for 
curve and surface singularities.  “Our approach here should be considered a first attempt….in 
finding curve and surface singularities…[our] heuristics are simple, and more work remains to 
improve them.” (7) 
 Nevertheless, what is of interest here is the means by which a Clifford algebraic CFD 
algorithm can determine the existence of curve and surface singularities, and track their location 
in R3  given a vector field  V: M → R3.  The authors demonstrate their results using various 
constructed examples.  Based on the fact that every element in a Clifford algebra is invertible,62 
the authors ran cases such as determining the line singularities for vector fields such as:  













     and ( )321 ˆ,ˆ,ˆ eee  are the unit orthonormal vectors spanning R3.  
An example like this would prove impossible to construct using standard vector calculus on 
manifolds, since the ‘inverse’ or quotient operation is undefined in the case of ordinary vectors.  
Hence the rich geometric and algebraic structure of Clifford algebras admits constructions and 
cases for fields that would prove inadmissible using standard approaches.  The algorithm works 
also for sampled vector fields.  “Regardless of the interpolation method, our method would find 
the singularities within the interpolated sampled field.” (ibid., 5) 
                                               
62
 See A.2, in the discussion following Defn A.2.5, for further details. 
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 The Clifford algebraic CFD algorithms developed by the authors yield some of the 
following results: 
1. A means for determining higher-order singularities, otherwise off-limits in standard 
CFD topology.  
2. A means for locating surface and curve singularities for computed as well as sampled 
vector fields.  Moreover, in the former case, the invertibility of Clifford elements 
produces constructions of vector fields subject to analyses that would otherwise prove 
inadmissible in standard vector field based formalisms. 
3. A far more elegant and computationally efficient means for calculating the indices of 
singularities. 
 
Clifford algebraic CFD procedures that would refine Mann and Rockwood’s algorithms 
(described in §2 in this chapter) by determining for instance the indices of surface singularities, 
as well as being computationally more efficient, are precisely the cases that will serve as 
effective responses against Batterman’s claims.  For there would exist formalisms rivaling, in 
their expressive power, the standard Navier-Stokes approach.  But such CFD research relies 
exclusively on finite-dimensional Clifford algebraic techniques, and would not appeal to the 
asymptotic singularities in the standard Navier-Stokes formulation in any meaningful way.  
Certainly the “first attempt” by Mann and Rockwood in characterizing surface singularities is an 
impressive one, in what appears to be the onset of a very promising and compelling research 
program. 
 
IV. Concluding Remarks: A Case for Constructive Realism? 
 
In Kallfelz (2009b) I show how a Clifford Algebraic approach finds a natural home in 
elements of structuralist philosophy of science.   In other words, as physicist and philosopher 
Fritz Rohrlich has demonstrated: it is perfectly consistent for a physicist to accommodate an 
ontological pluralism in a particular class of theory-formation, but at the same time remain 
methodologically monist.  Moreover, such methodological monism is best characterized in a 
mode and manner that does not hearken back to renditions of logical empiricism based on strong 
claims of logical reductionism (shown, as I do below, to be largely irrelevant if not outright 
hindering the progress of the development of theory formation).  The school of thought that 
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Rohrlich implicitly ascribes to as well as some of his associates like Diedrik Aertz and Juergen 
Ehlers explicitly advocate is structuralism, a highly mathematical version of the semantic view 
of theories enjoying ongoing and active innovation by European physicists and philosophers of 
the likes of Erhard Scheibe (1997-1999).63  Structuralists like Rohrlich ascribe to realism, as it 
best underwrites notions such as domains of validity, ontological strata, etc., that any mature 
mathematically based theory exhibits.  I summarize some of his claims below: 
 
IV.1. Elements of Structuralism 
 
The ‘internal’ structure of certain aspects of a non-developing (i.e., accepted, mature, or 
established) theory T includes: 
• An ontology O (T) 
• A set of central terms τ(T), with an accompanying semantics σ(T). 
• Set(s) of principles Π(T) 
•  A mathematical structure M (T) 
• A domain of validity D(T) 
 
In Rohrlich (1988, 302) the list of aspects is presented in a subtly different manner.64  In terms of 
theory-reduction, one should deal only with mature or established theories, whose characteristic 
components include: 
                                               
63
 “Structuralism” is also a term that appears often in certain branches of the philosophy of mathematics (e.g., 
Charles Chihara (1990, 2003)).  Certainly, structuralists in the philosophy of mathematics share metaphysically 
resonant themes with those mentioned above, as both schools of thought assent to a generally constructivist position 
(as opposed to a Platonic “essentialism”) concerning the ontological status of theoretical entities.  Nevertheless, the 
projects’ motivations differ.  Mathematical structuralists are primarily concerned with resolving issues centering on 
ontological status, while structuralists in the philosophy of science are typically motivated more by epistemic and 
methodological concerns.  Aside from the issue of a “rapprochement” of methods in philosophy of science vis-à-vis 
philosophy of mathematics I briefly discuss, a larger comparative and contrastive analysis concerning these two 
structuralist traditions lies beyond the scope of this essay. 
64
 As mentioned above the list of aspects is by no means meant to be exhaustive, which reflects the anti-
reductionism of structuralism in the sense of its repudiation of the attempt to reduce the semantic and syntactic 
content of scientific theories to formal axiomatic systems (recall n. 62  above).  Hence no single list of structural 
aspects sufficiently constitutes a theory, let alone if such aspects were characterized in closed axiomatic form. 
Rorhlich and Hardin (1983) are even more explicitly adamant against axiomatic reductionism, which they are quick 
to mention is not what is implied by their model of inter-theoretic reduction.  Scientists, they argue, should in 
general avoid axiomatization as the scheme “is difficult and in general equivocal.” (605)  (They proceed to mention 
the numerous schemes of attempts at axiomatizing quantum mechanics, all of which by nature are rather different, 
some even opposed).  Instead they go on to say that scientists use mathematical structures of two or more theories, 
seeking to establish a ‘conceptual dictionary’ among notions conveyed by such mathematical structures which 
appear similar. (605)  In yet another article, Aerts & Rohrlich (1998, 27) describe three kinds of reduction: a.) 
logical (i.e. reducing to some axiomatic framework), b.) theory reduction (‘semantic reduction’), and c.) reductive 
explanation (‘explanatory reduction’).  They proceed to state that their paper will not cover logical reduction, since: 
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• An ontic component O  
• An epistemic component E 
• A language and conceptual content component L, which includes formal and informal 
language, and a subset of central terms τ.65  
• Set(s) of principles Π(T) 
•  A mathematical-logical structure component M66  
• A domain of validity D(T) 
Rohrlich succinctly states that Nagel’s (1974) model of reduction (as mentioned briefly in 
the preceding subsection above) holds between (mature) theories T and T / whenever there exists 
a mapping Φ: τ( T / ) → τ( T ), i.e. the central terms of T must be functions of those of T /.67  On 
the other hand (recalling Nickles (1975)) physicists are generally intuitive about the issue of 
inter-theoretic reduction, typically deriving just the mathematical structures from one theory to 
another.  Moreover, in this more pedestrian but representative case, the physicists: 
…pay little attention to whether the concepts resulting from the physical interpretation of 
the symbols permit such a functional relation [a’ la Nagel]…The mathematical structure 
or framework of the theory is considered to be primary, and the central terms (the 
meaning of certain central symbols) can be later derived from the applications of that 
framework to actual situations.  (1988, 303) 
 
                                                                                                                                                       
“Logical reduction is a formal procedure that can be used in a scientific theory only post facto, after the theory has 
been formulated based on empirical information…in no known case does axiomatization of a theory help to 
elucidate the scientific problems one encounters.” (Aerts & Rohrlich (1998) 28, italics added)     
65
 One recognizes this as a slightly more refined description of the set of central terms τ(T), with an accompanying 
semantics σ(T) mentioned in Rohrlich (1994). 
66
 The essential importance of this component for mature scientific theories cannot be over-emphasized.  Aside from 
its obvious feature including deriving the central equations of a theory, quantitative explanatory and predictive 
power: 
 
[M can probe where] human intuition fails…when the theory refers to those aspects of nature which lie 
outside our direct experience, the mathematical structure becomes the backbone of the scenario, [the 
model] which characterizes this indirect knowledge.  [Moreover]…[t]he conceptual model associated with 
a theory is largely derived by confronting M with empirical evidence and with neighboring theories 
(testing and coherence)…involv[ing] informal language and is not the result of logical-mathematical 
deduction. (Rohrlich (1988), 301) 
 
As mentioned in n. 80 above, so this above passage likewise distinguishes a structuralist’s approach to mathematical 
structure and their use from a logical reductionist, as evidenced in the implication of abductive reasoning 
“involv[ing] informal language….not the result of …deduction.”   
67
 If the mapping is surjective (onto, i.e. Φ[τ(T / )] = τ(T) ) then the reduction is homogeneous.  Otherwise (i.e., if the 
mapping is strictly into:  Φ[τ(T / )] ⊂ τ(T) ) the reduction is heterogeneous. 
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The above point is used, for instance, to reconcile Feyerabend’s (1963) theoretical 
pluralism (and its associated incommensurability issues) and at the same time ensuring a well-
defined logical-mathematical linkage between two theories T and T / by recognizing that such 
two theories can refer to different cognitive (or epistemic) levels: In other words the fact that a 
reduction relation may hold between M(T) and M(T / ) does not guarantee that such a relation 
exists between L(T) and L(T / ), O(T) and O(T / ), or E(T) and E(T / ), etc.:  “The mathematical 
framework of [T] is rigorously derived from that of [T /] (a derivation which involves limiting 
procedures); but the interpretation and the ensuing ontologies [of T and T /] are in general not so 
related.”68 (1988, 303) 
  
a.) The epistemic Component E 
Recall the distinction between developing versus mature theories as discussed above.  In 
an insightful commentary on Rohrlich, Ryszard Wojcicki (1998) writes: 
Rather than treating a theory which has reached the mature stage as a partially adequate 
description of the external world, Rohrlich (if I convey his position correctly) treats it as a 
cognitive counterpart of…ontological levels, or perhaps I should say ‘ontological regions of 
reality.’ (38)  
 
In other words, what distinguishes a mature theory are distinctively stable reciprocal dynamics 
between its cognitive (or epistemic) and ontological levels.  Such a stable correspondence 
implies (within its domain of validity) that one can associate a distinctive cognitive level 
associated with a robust ontological level: 
The existence of different concepts on different levels justifies one’s talking about 
qualitative differences between levels…It thus follows that one level does not make 
another level superfluous.  Both are needed; which theory is the suitable one depends on 
the domain of parameters…[t]he concepts we employ, the questions we ask, and the 
answers we are prepared to accept will be controlled by the domain of discourse—the 
ontological level—which we intend. (Rohrlich & Hardin (1983), 610)  
 
                                               
68
 Feyerabend of course may brush this aside as a red herring, or as just a re-statement of the problem of 
incommensurability.  Recall in n. 75 Feyerabend’s very point was just what Rohrlich (1988) seems to be re-iterating: 
a mathematical reduction will not guarantee a semantic one.  However, if one accepts the structuralist maxim of a 
theory being composed of a plurality of aspects including semantic, mathematical, ontological components, then 
Rohrlich’s points make good sense: one can guarantee reduction in one aspect but not in others.  Only if one held 
fast to some reductionism claiming that the semantic content is what is essential to a theory (i.e., its L, O, E 
components) does the incommensurability issue then become a more serious concern.          
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 So the ontological component, the epistemic component, and the validity domain of a 
mature theory (O, E ,D) all mutually co-refer in important ways.  Yet each aspect or component 
has its distinct features as well, so they can (to a certain extent) be considered independently of 
each other.  In the case of O,  I will mention in passing that it forms such a crucial tier of my 
discussion as to deserve its own major section (see §4 below), because it remains inextricably 
tied to notions like verisimilitude and representation.  The validity domain D , on the other hand, 
depends crucially on extensions of Nickel’s (1975) ‘domain preserving’ reduction, that 
Batterman (2007) extended in his Schema R (discussed in the previous subsection above). 
 The issue of the epistemic aspect of a mature theory E, as hooking into a coherent and 
consistent ontological aspect O, is best illustrated by way of a counter-instance, as what would 
occur in the case of a developing or immature theory.  Developing theories do not yet possess a 
stable ontological aspect O, hence their epistemic component is volatile.  To name one 
contemporary instance: consider the case of String Theory.  This developing theory’s greatest 
strength is also its chief weakness: String Theory possesses a richly mathematical component M 
at the expense of its epistemic and ontological components.  Efforts to ‘interpret’ the theory 
range from some extremely dubious version of Platonism (Brian Greene) in which an ontology is 
imposed in a ham-fisted manner relegating most of the theory’s essential terms to unobservable 
abstractions, devoid of any operational content.69  Other interpretations verge on the 
instrumentalist, regarding some of its mathematical results as empirically adequate at best, but 
the essential terms are devoid of ontological content aside from predictive value.  A similar case 
can be made for developing versions of Ptolemaic astronomy in Antiquity (as opposed to the late 
Middle Ages), despite its mathematical sophistication. 
 On the other hand, in the case of mature theories, cognitive levels occur in E due to 
“cognitive (or epistemic) emergence.”70 (Rohrlich (1988) 3)  Rohrlich’s notion of cognitive 
emergence is similar to the notion of ‘epistemic emergence’ discussed in Humphreys (1997), 
Silberstein & McGeever’s (1999), and in Kronz & Tiehen (2002) in that the notion spells no 
ontological difficulties: Cognitive emergence is contextual insofar as it is entirely constituted by 
the relationship our cognitive apparatus has with its referent.  An apparent emergence of new 
                                               
69
 See Finkelstein (1996, 2001, 2004a-c, 2007) for criticism of this developing theory. 
70
 I discuss the issue of emergence in greater detail in Chapter 2 below.  See also Kallfelz (2009). 
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objects (atoms, stars, organisms, etc.) having certain unique properties identified by humans’ 
cognitive apparatus:  
suggest…something qualitatively new has evolved…[only] because it differs perceptively 
from anything that there was at the earlier stages [of cosmic evolution]; there is a 
recognition of this fact that is sudden despite the realization that nothing discontinuous 
has happened. (Rohrlich (1988), 298) 
 
In other words, such  ‘new’ objects are characterized via an idealization: “their detailed structure 
has become unimportant.  Characterizations are approximations…beyond a certain observational 
precision they become empirically inadequate.” (298-299)  It is a short step to realize the 
ubiquitous and unremarkable fact of epistemically emergent cognitive levels once one accepts 
the truism that “it is only through idealizations, and what…we can think of as their alter-ego—
inexact truths—that we have access to the world.”71 (Paul Teller (2004b) 447) 
b.) The Ontological Component O 
As described above, the epistemic component of mature theories corresponds with a 
robust ontology in a stably reciprocal manner, underwritten by the inevitably idealizing activity 
of both: For instance in the epistemic component of classical mechanics the emergent cognitive 
level of ‘massive bodies subjected to macroscopic forces’ corresponds to the ontological 
component of the theory containing ‘fallible veracities’72 like ‘point mass,’ ‘frictionless planes,’ 
etc., rendered possible only through an idealizing activity ignoring details of the massive bodies’ 
constituents at the molecular, or atomic, or nuclear, or sub-nuclear, or Planck scales, etc. 
A central metaphysical point that Rohrlich makes from the above is his advocating a 
pluralist ontology, constituted by a substantial monism: 
                                               
71
 Paul Teller’s (2005) argument is certainly not some endorsement of idealism of sense-data characteristic of certain 
elements of British empiricism from the 17th to the 20th centuries: “The British empiricists thought that thinking 
consists in having a stream of ‘ideas’ [representations], and concluded mistakenly that all we ever think about are 
our own ideas.” (Alan Musgrave (1985), in Curd & Cover (1998), n. 2, 1223-1224)  Teller’s claim comes as a 
concluding statement of his argument against quantitative verisimilitude, i.e., that there exists some context-
independent way of determining ‘closeness to truth’ of our theories.  Teller argues that ‘closeness to truth’ is an 
inevitably contextual notion and recognizing this entails that the distinction between a ‘foundational theory’ and 
‘phenomenological theory’ is likewise context-relative: Foundational theories distort, approximate, and idealize as 
much as ‘phenomenological’ theories do.  Conversely, “[Though] I accept that foundational theories do tell us a 
great deal about how the world really is.  I note also that many ‘phenomenological’ theories [however] …tell us 
about the world in the same kind of way that the foundational theories do.” (Teller (2004b), 446)  I will discuss 
Teller’s insights in greater detail in §4 below. 
72
 A term Teller (2004b) suggests one should use in lieu of ‘useful fictions.’  “[I]mperfect characterizations [still] 
genuinely inform…just calling them ‘fiction’ thus misleads.  But we do want to acknowledge that these 
characterizations are not simply true.” (445)  
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[I]t is our cognitive capacity, our ability to perceive, to recall, to recognize, and to draw 
analogies [all inevitably idealizing activities] that is…responsible for this pluralistic 
nature of our ontology.  We…encounter it in the cognitive emergence of new 
objects…[nevertheless the standpoint of] cosmic evolution is in support of the notion of 
the unity of nature (substantive monism).73  (1988, 297) 
 
There is nevertheless a substantial monism as entities evolve continuously (or quasi-continuously 
in the case of quantum mechanics74) “unfold[ing] into increasing complexity.” (298) 
 The idealization underwriting the conceptual levels of the epistemic as well as the 
associated ontological components of a mature theory corresponds to a level of coarseness 
(determined by the extent of the idealization and simplification) for the basic level of the domain 
of scientific inquiry.  “I prefer the terms ‘coarser’ and ‘finer’ level of theory [rather than]…terms 
such as ‘more fundamental’, ‘superseding’, ‘supervening’, ‘primary’, etc. [as the latter notions] 
prejudice the case.”75 (299)  Hence in this context, the convention I have been adopting for 
preceding and superseding theories (T and T /, respectively) apply equally well to Rohrlich’s 
‘coarser’ and ‘finer’ theories; i.e., theories T and T /,  with the former whose ontological 
component O (T) is coarser relative to the latter’s O (T / ).  Moreover, though most physical 
theories have an ontological component at a certain level of coarseness, some ‘framework 
theories’ like mechanics (whether classical, statistical, or quantum) have ontological components 
containing several levels of coarseness.76   
c.) The Validity Domain D 
                                               
73
 The notion of cognitive emergence (vis-à-vis substantial unity in cosmic evolution) is resonant with some of  A. 
N. Whitehead’s (1929/1978) ideas:  “Process and Reality divides actual entities/occasions into four grades of 
ascending complexity…[which] is not a fundamental division according to kind or essence, but a qualitative 
classification by complexity, and a coarse one at that.” (Finkelstein & Kallfelz (1997), 289).  For a review of certain 
contemporary notions of emergence with respect to  the implied substantial monism of Whitehead, see also Kallfelz 
(2009) 
74
 “The discontinuities in quantum mechanics do not prevent predictability but they restore it to a probabilistic one.” 
(Rohrlich (1988), n.1 298) 
75
 Note however, such terms apply just to the physical sciences, where the size of an object is a determining factor.  
“[F]or other scientific levels qualitative distinctions may dominate over quantitative ones.” (299)  It is this 
distinction of coarse versus fine that Batterman (2002) gave passing mention to. 
76
 In the case of mechanics: the distinction between particle and rigid body dynamics.  The latter corresponds to a 
finer ontological level relative to the former since accounting for torques, angular momenta and rotational inertia on 
the body necessitates that it cannot be modeled as a single point particle.  In the case of statistical mechanics, the 
science “interpolates between levels of the microworld and the macroworld.” (1988, n. 2, 299)  Also in the case of 
quantum mechanics (non-relativistic and relativistic) its ontological component is not restricted to one level of 
coarseness either, ranging from the nucleonic to macroscopic in the case of Bose condensations.   
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The reduction of a coarser theory T to a finer theory T /  requires M(T /) to converge to 
M(T ) whenever the validity domain of T / , i.e D(T /), is restricted to that of D(T ).  Echoing 
Nickles’ (1975) domain preserving notion of intertheory reduction, the above necessarily 
involves a limiting process.(303)  This limiting process involves a parameter p which must be 
dimensionless (recall n. 77 above) as well as have the functional form p = f(x,x/ ) where: x/ is a 
quantity or array of quantities in     M(T /) and x is a quantity or an array of quantities in M(T ). 
“Given the finer theory [alone], it is not obvious what the characteristic parameter p actually is.  
It becomes evident only when the coarser theory is known.” (304)  For example, in the previous 
example mentioned above involving momentum in finer theory of Special Relativistic Dynamics 





p = .  




= , where λ 
is the wavelength of the EM wavefront, and L is the slit width.  In the case of the Bohr 
Correspondence Principle between non-relativistic quantum mechanics (NRQM) and classical 
mechanics (CM), ( )
R
fp h= , where f is some analytic function77 of h  with range values 
expressed in length dimension, and R is the average radius of the spatial region.78 
Hence borrowing from Batterman’s Schema R notation, one can characterize the 
reductions as: lim
 p →0 M(T /)  = M(T  ) whenever D(T /) is restricted to D(T ).  However, 
whenever such a reduction holds, it does not follow that there exists some mapping Φ: M(T /)  
→ M(T  ), which would signal a stronger case of semantic reduction (a’ la Nagel) (302).  Also, 
the reduction need not be unique: There can exist several parameters p1 , p2, …such that: lim p1 →0 
M(T /)  = M(T 1 ),  
lim
 p2 →0 M(T /)  = M(T 2 ), etc.79(305) 
                                               
77
 I.e. a ‘smooth’ or continuously differentiable (to all orders) function f(x) (real or complex-valued.  In the complex 
case, every differentiable function is automatically analytic.  Every analytic function can be expressed as a 
convergent power series, hence its limit behavior is everywhere well-defined. 
78
 Note however in other cases of reduction of NRQM to NM, one could also choose the more elementary p =(# of 
quanta) in the p →∞ limit. 
79
 For an interesting case, see Finkelstein et. al. (2001) who develop several Clifford algebraic contraction 
parameters in their general Clifford algebraic quantum space-time formalism, and proceed to show how their 
Clifford commutation relations converge to the classical symplectic algebra in the limit of one of their contraction 
parameters, versus the former converging to the Heisenberg algebra for another contraction parameter. 
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 The parameter p is naturally interpreted as establishing a validity domain D of a theory.  
“A validity limit is thus equivalent to a specification of the error made by using the lower level 
[coarser theory T] instead of the higher level theory [T /].” (Rohrlich & Hardin (1983), 607)  
Hence in terms of T / any prediction made by T should be multiplied by the factor (1 ± p).  For 
instance, in the case of NM predicting the motion of the Earth vis-à-vis SRD, the former is 





p = , where v is the average speed of the Earth relative to the 
Sun, hence the predictions of NM are accurate to within (1 ± 10-8).  This establishes of course a 
measure of the reliability of NM’s predictions, hence its validity domain D(NM).  Validity limits 
characterize theories as approximate (in the light of their finer counterparts), however “[i]n most 
cases the approximation involved, is extremely good.” (Rohrlich & Hardin (1983), 608) 
 The validity domain’s connection with the ontological component O is apparent in the 
following sense: an ontological level naturally corresponds to a case in which p is negligible to a 
sufficiently good approximation.  
Since p either is or is not negligible, there is no intermediate situation.  But what makes 
this definition of ontological level…is the large size of the domains of validity of 
theories: it spaces ontological levels far apart. (609) 
 
Regarding the aforementioned issue of conceptual emergence: 
[T]here is in many cases no simple relation between the concepts of theories on two 
different [ontological] levels.  The limiting procedure that relates  
[T /]…to [T] can in fact create new concepts…not present in the higher level theory. (ibid) 
 
By way of an elementary calculus example (reminiscent of Batterman’s (2007) example 
of ε x2 + x – 9 = 0) Rohrlich & Hardin demonstrate this in terms of an arclength of a circular 
sector ds = rdθ, compared to the length of its inscribed secant dl: 
  
          
 
     
Fig. 4.1: Representation of the secant-tangent relation in Rohrlich’s illustration concerning 







Now in the limit: r → ∞ , then ds → dl, hence ds assumes the property ‘straight’.  “The property 
‘straight’ did not exist on the circle but was produced by the limiting procedure.” (609)  In an 
emblematically physical example of the same conceptual kind, in the N  → 0 limit (where N is 
the number of bodies of appreciable mass) in a local space-time region M, gµν(x) → Λµν, where 
gµν(x) is the variable metric of general relativity (GR) at a space-time point x∈M, and Λµν is the 
constant Lorentz metric characterizing flat Minkowski space-time in special relativity (SR).  
Various space-time symmetries occur in such a manner exhibiting Poincare’ Group invariance in 
SR dynamics, but this property doesn’t manifest in the curved and dynamical space-time of GR. 
(610) 
 Last of all, despite this seemingly facile characterization of the limit:  
lim
 p →0 M(T /)  = M(T  )  in theory, it remains a delicate and complicated procedure to attempt 
to carry it out in practice80: 
The limiting process involved can be very complicated as well as very subtle.  Some of the 
limiting processes have so far not been carried out in a mathematically satisfactory way, but 
for enough to satisfy the intuitive expectations of the physicist. (Rohrlich & Hardin (1983), 
n.3, 605)    
 
The reduction of the symmetry properties of [M(T /)] to those of [M(T )] plays a very 
significant role…[f]rom a technical point of view, it shows that the limiting process is highly 
nontrivial and must be carried out very carefully: the symmetry reduction may be the result 
of group contraction, and the limit can only be carried out in suitable group representations.  
But we shall not pursue these mathematical matters here. (Rohrlich (1988) 304) 
 
 
IV.2: In Closing: A Case for a Realist Interpretation of CACFD 
  
In “top-down” fashion I have summarized elements I discuss further in Kallfelz (2009b) 
concerning “methodological fundamentalism” and Rohrlich’s notion echoed in his claims for an 
“ontological pluralism and methodological monism” within the framework of any mature 
mathematical theory.  Certainly CFD is an example thereof: One can, depending on the relative 
coarse or fine-graining, move among the stable ontological strata characterized either by 
                                               
80
 A noteworthy example is Ehlers (1986) who, inspired by Rohrlich & Hardin, constructed two concrete case 
studies rigorously demonstrating the reduction of Lorentz invariant scattering theory to Galilean invariant scattering 
theory (390-396), as well as a partial reduction of GR to Newtonian gravitation (396-400).  The technical rigor and 
mathematical sophistication should prove itself to be convincing enough of the inherent challenges regarding the 
attempt to carry out the limiting procedure in practice.   
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continuous flow (Navier-Stokes) or by the relatively more finer grained and ontologically 
nuanced Clifford-Algebraic simulations. 
As suggested above, a realist interpretation naturally suggests itself, insofar as it best 
underwrites in a rigorous and systematic manner a means of characterizing verisimilitude81, as 
suggested above in the notion of a theory’s “domains of validity.” From the bottom-up, such a 
framework provides good reason, pace Winsberg (2003, 2006) of Hughes’ realist interpretation 
of simulations: “[C]omputer ‘experiments’ reveal information about actual, possible, or 
impossible worlds.” (Winsberg, 2003, 115).  Indeed, this is a paraphrase of Giere’s “constructive 
realism”, as mentioned in n. 15 above.  Winsberg persuasively argues that computer simulations 
are an instance of the model-building activity in theory-articulation, so the question of realism 
versus constructive empiricism (Van Frassen (1980)) and other instances of anti-realism reduces 
to how much stock one is willing to invest in terms of the breadth of a model’s modal scope.  
Add to that, aspects of Hacking’s notion suggest themselves as well, as the case can be plausibly 
advanced (within the general structuralist framework) that within the domain of validity as set by 
the “simulationists[‘] and experimenters[‘]…need to engage in error management,” (Winsberg 
2003, 120) a case can be made that this is an instance of realization82 (Norton & Suppe (2000)) 
of CACFD vis-à-vis  the states of the actual fluid.   
Appendices 
Appendix A.: A Brief Synopsis of the Relevant Algebraic Structures 
A.1: Category Algebra and Category Theory 
 
 As authors like Hestenes (1984, 1986), Snygg (1997), Lasenby, et. al. (2000) promote Clifford 
Algebra as a unified mathematical language for physics, so Adamek (1990), Mikhalev & Pilz (2000) and 
many others similarly claim that Category Theory likewise forms a unifying basis for all branches of 
mathematics.  There are also mathematical physicists like Robert Geroch (1985) who seem to bridge these 
two presumably unifying languages by building up a mathematical toolchest comprising most of the 
                                               
81
 I expand upon these points in Kallfelz (2009b), pp. 30-40, along the lines of semantic issues as well, in which I 
discuss aspects of Yablo & Gallois (1998).   
82
 Any system S1  realizes system S2 if there exists an onto mapping Φ: S2→  S1 which is behavior-preserving of the 
states of S2 onto the states of S1.  (Winsberg, 2003, 114-115).  One might add that this notion of “behavior-
preservation” can be leant greater precision regarding the notion of an algebraic isomorphism (product structure 
preserving map) from the “product” (composition of states in S2) to the (Clifford) product of CACFD S1. 
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salient algebraic and topological structures for the workaday mathematical physicist from a Category-
theoretic basis. 
 A category is defined as follows: 
• Defn. A1.1: A category C = 〈Ω, MOR(Ω),° 〉 is the ordered triple where: 
a.) Ω is the class of C’s objects. 
b.) MOR(Ω) is the set of morphisms defined on Ω.  Graphically, this can be depicted (where ϕ ∈ 
MOR(Ω), A∈Ω, B ∈Ω): BA →ϕ      
c.) The elements of MOR(Ω) are connected by the product ° which obeys the law of  composition: 
For A∈Ω, B ∈Ω, C ∈Ω: if ϕ is the morphism from A to B, and if ψ is a morphism from B to C, 
then ψ °ϕ is a morphism from A to C, denoted graphically: 
CACBBA →=→→ ϕψψϕ oo .  Furthermore: 
c.1)  ° is associative: For any morphisms φ , ϕ , ψ  with product defined in as in c.) above, 
then: ( ) ( ) ϕφψϕφψϕφψ oooooo ≡= . 
c.2) Every morphism is equipped with a left and a right identity.  That is, if ψ is any 
morphism from A to B, (where A and B are any two objects) then there exists the (right) 
identity morphism on A (denoted ιA  ) such that: ψ ° ιA  = ψ.  Furthermore, for any object 
C, if ϕ is any morphism from C to A, then there exists the (left) identity morphism on A 
(ιA ) such that:  ιA° ϕ = ϕ .  Graphically, the left (or right) identity morphisms can be 
depicted as loops.   
 
 A simpler way to define a category is in terms of a special kind of semigroup (i.e. a set S closed 
under an associative product).  Since identities are defined for every object, one can in principle identify 
each object with its associated (left/right) identity.  That is to say, for any morphism ϕ from A to B, with 
associated left/right identities ιB , ιA, identify: ιB = λ, ιA = ρ . Hence condition c2) above can be re-stated as 
c2/ ): “For every ϕ there exist (λ, ρ ) such that: λ° ϕ = ϕ, and ϕ ° ρ  = ϕ.”  With this apparent 
identification, DefnI.1 is coextensive with that of a “semigroup with enough identities.  
Category theory provides a unique insight into the general nature, or universal features of the 
construction process that practically all mathematical systems share, in one way or another.  Set theory 
can be embedded into category theory, but not vice versa.  Such basic universal features involved in the 
construction of mathematical systems, which category theory generalizes and systematizes, include, at 




Feature Underlying Notion 
Objects The collection of primitive, or stipulated, entities of the 
mathematical system.  
Product 
 
How to ‘concatenate and combine,’ in a natural manner, to form 
new objects or entities in the mathematical system respecting the 
properties of what are characterized by the system’s stipulated 
objects. 




How all such objects, relative to the system, are understood to be 
equivalent. 
              Table A.1.1 
 
For an informal demonstration of how such general aspects are abstracted from three different 
mathematical systems (sets, groups, and topological spaces83), for instance, see Table A.1.2 below. 
I.a) Set 
(by Principle of Extension) SΦ = {x | Φ(x) } for some property Φ 
I.b) Cartesian  
Product 
For any two sets X, Y : X× Y = {(x,y)| x ∈ X,  y ∈ Y} 
  I.c) Mapping For any two sets X, Y, where f ⊆ X× Y, f is a mapping from X to Y 
(denoted  f : X → Y ) iff for x1∈ X , y1∈ Y ,y∈ Y, if (x1, y1)∈ f (denoted: y1  
= f(x 1)) (x1, y2)∈ f  then: y1 = y2.   
I.d) Bijection (set For any two sets X, Y, where f : X → Y  is a mapping, then f is a bijection 
                                               
83
 Such systems, of course, are not conceptually disjunct: topological spaces and groups are of course defined in 
terms of sets.  The additional element of structure comprising the concept of group includes the notion of a binary 
operation (which itself can be defined set-theoretically in terms of a mapping) sharing the algebraic property of 
associativity.  The structural element distinguishing a topological space is also described set-theoretically by use of 
notions of ‘open’ sets.  Moreover, groups and topological spaces can conceptually overlap as well in the notion of a 
topological group.  So in an obvious sense, set theory remains a general classification language for mathematical 
systems as well.  However, the expressive power of set theory pales in comparison to that of category theory.  To put 
it another way, if category theory and set theory are conceived of as deductive systems (Lewis), it could be argued 
that category theory exhibits a better combination of “strength and simplicity” than does naïve set theory.  
Admittedly, however, this is not a point which can be easily resolved as far as the simplicity issue goes because the 
very concept of a category is usually cashed out in terms of three fundamental notions (objects, morphisms, 
associative composition), whereas, at least in the case of ‘naïve’ set theory (NST), we have fundamentally two 
notions: a) of membership ∈ defined by extension, and b) the hierarchy of types (i.e., for any set X, X ⊆ X, but X ∉ X 
.  Or to put more generally, Z ∈ W is a meaningful expression, though it may be false, provided, for any set, X: Z 
∈℘(k)(X) and W∈℘(k +1)(X), where k is any non-negative integer, and ℘(k)(X) defines the kth-level power-set 
operation, i.e.: ℘(m)(X) =℘(℘(…k times…(X)) .)       
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equivalence) iff: a) f is onto (surjective), i.e. f(X) = Y (i.e., for any y∈Y there exists a 
x∈X such that: f(x) = y, b) f is 1-1 (injective) iff  for x1∈ X , y1∈ Y ,y∈ Y, if 
(x1, y1)∈ f (denoted: y1  = f(x 1)) (x1, y2)∈ f  then: y1 = y2.   
II.a) Group I.e., a group 〈G, °〉 is a set G with a binary operation ° on G such that: a.) ° 
is closed with respect to G, i.e.: ∀(x, y) ∈G :  (x ° y ) ≡ z ∈ G (i.e., ° is a 
mapping into G or ° : G × G → G, or °(G × G)  ⊆ G)).  b.)   ° is associative 
with respect to G,: ∀(x, y, z) ∈G:  (x ° y ) ° z = x ° (y ° z) ≡ x ° y ° z,  c.) 
There (uniquely) exists a (left/right) identity element  e ∈ G :  ∀ (x∈ G) 
∃! (e ∈ G) : x°e = x = e°x.  d.) For every x there exists an inverse element 
of x, i.e.: ∀ (x∈ G) ∃ (x/ ∈ G): x° x/  = e = x/ °x.    
II.b) Direct product For any two groups G, H, their direct product (denoted G ⊗ H) is a group, 
with underlying set is G × H and whose binary operation * is defined as, 
for any (g1, h1)∈ G × H, (g2, h2)∈ G × H : 
(g1, h1)* (g2, h2) = ((g1° h1), (g2 •h2)), where °, • are the respective binary 
operations for G,and H. 
II.c) Group 
homomorphism 
Any structure-preserving mapping ϕ from two groups G and H.  I.e. ϕ : G 
→ H is a homomorphism iff for any g1∈ G, g2∈G : ϕ(g1° g2) = ϕ(g1)•ϕ(g2) 




Any structure-preserving bijection ψ from two groups G and H.  I.e. ψ : 
G → H is an isomorphism iff for any g1∈ G, g2∈G : ψ (g1° g2) = ψ (g1)• ψ 
(g2)  (where °, • are the respective binary operations for G,and H ) and ψ is 
a bijection (see I.d above) between group-elements G and H.  Two groups 
are isomorphic (algebraically equivalent, denoted: G  ≅ H ) iff there exists 
an isomorphism connecting them ψ : G → H.)        
III.a) Topological 
Space 
Any set X endowed with a collection τX of its subsets (i.e. τX  ⊆℘(X), 
where℘(X) is X’s power-set, such that: 1) ∅∈τX  ,  X∈τX 2) For any U, 
U/∈τX , then:  U ∩U/∈τX  .  3)  For any index (discrete or continuous) γ 




U  .  X is then denoted 
as a topological space, and τX  is its topology.  Elements U belonging to 
τX  are denoted as open sets.  Hence 1), 2), 3) say that the empty set and 
all of X are always open, and finite intersections of open sets are open, 
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while arbitrary unions of open sets are always open.  Moreover: 1)  Any 
collection of subsets ℑ of X is a basis for X’s topology iff for any U∈τX , 
then for any index (discrete or continuous) γ belonging to index-set Γ: if 




U    (i.e., arbitrary unions of basis elements are 
open sets.) 2) Any collection of subsets Σ of X is a subbasis if for any 







ℑ (I.e. finite intersections of sub-basis 
elements are basis elements for X’s topology.)   
III.b) Topological 
product 
For any two topological spaces X, Y, their topological product (denotedτX  
⊗ τY ) is defined by taking, as a sub-basis, the collection: {(U,V)| U∈τX , 
V∈τY }.  I.e., τX  ×τY is a subbasis for τX  ⊗ τY.   This is immediately 
apparent since, for U1 and U2 open in X, and V1 and V2 open in Y : since: 
( ) ( )22112121 VUVUVVUU ∩×∩=×∩×   this indeed forms a basis. 
III.c) Continuous 
mapping 
Any mapping  from two topological spaces X and Y, preserving openness.  





Any continous bijection h from two topological spaces X and Y.  I.e. h : X 
→ Y is a homeomorphsim iff : a) h is continuous (see III.c), b) h is a 
bijection (See I.d).  Two spaces X and Y are topologically equivalent (i.e., 
homeomorphic, denoted:  
X  ≅ Y) iff  there exists a homeomorphism connecting them, i.e. h : X → Y 
        Table A.1.2 
     Now the classes of mathematical objects exhibited in Table A.1.2 comprising sets, groups, and 
topological spaces, all exhibit certain common features:  
• The concept of product (I.b, II.b, III.b) (or concatenating, in ‘natural manner’ property-
preserving structures.)  For instance, the Cartesian (I.b)  product preserves the ‘set-ness’ 
property for chains of objects formed from the class of sets, the direct product (II.b) 
preserves the ‘group-ness’ property under concatenation, etc.  
• The concept of ‘morphing’ (I.c, II.c, III.c) from one class of objects to another, in a 
property-preserving manner.  For instance, the continuous map (III.c) respects what 
makes spaces X  and Y ‘topological,’ when morphing from one to another.  The 
homomorphism respects the group properties shared by G and H, when ‘morphing’ from 
one to another, etc. 
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• The concept of ‘equivalence in form’ (isomorphism)  (I.d, II.d, III.d) defined via 
conditions placed on ‘how’ one should ‘morph,’ which fundmantally should be in an 
invertible manner.  One universally necessary condition for this to hold, is that such a 
manner is modeled as a bijection.  The other necessary conditions of course involve the 
particular property structure-respecting conditions placed on such morphisms. 
 
Similar to naïve set theory (NST) Category theory also preserves its form and structure on any level 
or category ‘type.’  That is to say, any two (or more) categories C, D can be part of the set of structured 
objects of a meta-category Χ whose morphisms (functors) respect the categorical structure of its 
arguments C, D.  That is to say: 
• Defn A1.2.  Given two categories C = 〈Ω, MOR(Ω),° 〉, D = 〈Ω’, MOR(Ω’),• 〉, a categorical 
functor Φ is a morphism in the meta-category Χ from objects C to D assigning each C-object (in 
Ω) a D-object (in Ω’) and each C-morphism (in MOR(Ω)) a D-morphism (in MOR(Ω’)) such that: 
a.) Φ preserves the ‘product’ (compositional) structure of the two categories, i.e., for any ϕ ∈ 
MOR(Ω),
 
ψ ∈ MOR(Ω):  Φ(ϕ 
 ° ψ) = Φ(ϕ ) • Φ(ψ) ≡ ϕ’ •ψ’  (where ϕ’ ,ψ’  are the Φ-images 
in D of the functors ϕ , ψ in C. 
b.) Φ preserves identity structure across all categories.  That is to say, for any A∈Ω, ιA ∈ 
MOR(Ω),  Φ(ιA) = ι Φ(A) = ι A’  where A’ is the D-object (in Ω’)  assigned by Φ.  (I.e., A’ =  
Φ(A)) 
 
Examples of functors include the ‘forgetful functor’ FOR: C→SET (where SET is the category of 
all sets) which has the effect of ‘stripping off’ any extra structure in a mathematical system C down to its 
‘bare-bones’ set-structure only.  That is to say, for any C-object A∈Ω, FOR(A) = SA (where SA is A’s 
underlying set), and for any ψ∈MOR(Ω):  FOR(ψ) = f is just the mapping (or functional) property of ψ.  
Robert Geroch (1985, p. 132, p. 248), for example, builds up the toolchest of the most important 
mathematical structures applied in physics, via a combination of (partially forgetful84) and (free 
construction functors.)  Part of this toolchest, for example, is suggested in the diagram below.  The boxed 
items represent the categories (of sets, groups, Abelian or commutative groups, etc.), the solid arrows are 
the (partially) forgetful functors, and the dashed arrows represent the free construction  
functors. 
   
                                               
84
 ‘Partially forgetful’ in the sense that the action of such functors does not collapse the structure entirely back to its 










Figure A1.1: Hierarchy of Categories Bound by Free Construction Functors and Forgetful 
Functors 
 
A.2 Clifford Algebras and Other Algebraic Structures 
 
 I proceed here by simply defining the necessary algebraic structures in an increasing hierarchy of 
complexity: 
Defn A2.1: (Group) A group 〈G, °〉 is a set G with a binary operation ° on G such that:  
a.) ° is closed with respect to G, i.e.: ∀(x, y) ∈G :  (x ° y ) ≡ z ∈ G (i.e., ° is a mapping into G or ° : 
G × G → G, or °(G × G)  ⊆ G)).   
b.) ° is associative with respect to G,: ∀(x, y, z) ∈G:  (x ° y ) ° z = x ° (y ° z) ≡ x ° y ° z,   
c.) There (uniquely) exists a (left/right) identity element  e ∈ G :  ∀ (x∈ G) ∃! (e ∈ G) : x°e = x = 
e°x.   
d.) For every x there exists an inverse element of x, i.e.: ∀ (x∈ G) ∃ (x/ ∈ G): x° x/  = e = x/ °x.    
 
In terms of categories, Defn A2.1 is coextensive with that of a monoid endowed with property A.2.1.d.).  
A monoid is a category in which all of its left and right identities coincide to one unique element.  For 
example, the integers Z form a monoid under integer multiplication (since, ∀n∈ Z ∃! 1∈ Z such that n.1 = 
n = 1.n), but not a group, since their multiplicative inverse can violate closure.  Whereas, the non-zero 
rational numbers Q* ={n/m | n ≠ 0, m ≠ 0} form an Abelian (i.e. commutative) group under multiplication. 
Defn A2.2: (Subgroups, Normal Subgroups, Simple Groups) 
i.) Let 〈G, °〉 be a group.  Then, for any H ⊆ G, H is a subgroup of G (denoted: H ∠ G) if for 
any x, y ∈ H, then x°y /∈ H.  In other words, H is closed under °, e∈ H, and if  x ∈ H then 
x 
/∈ H.  If H ∠ G, and H⊂ G, then H is a proper subgroup, denoted: H ∠ G.  Moreover, 
if denoted: ∅⊂ H, then H is non-trivial. 
ii.) H is a normal (or invariant) subgroup of G (denoted: GH < ) if its left and right cosets 
agree, for any g∈ G.  That is to say, GH <  iff ∀ g∈ G:  
SET GRP 




gH = {gh| h∈ H}=  Hg = {kg| k∈ H}. 
iii.) G is simple if G contains no proper, non-trivial, normal subgroups. 
 
Defn A2.3: (Vector Space) A vector space is to a structure 〈V, F, * , ⋅ 〉 endowed with a 
(commutative) operation (i.e. ∀(x,y)∈ V  : x*y = y*x, denoted, by convention, by the “+” symbol, 
though not necessarily to be understood as addition on the real numbers) such that:  
i) 〈V, *〉 is a commutative (or Abelian) group.  
ii) Given a field85 of scalars F the scalar multiplication mapping into V ⋅ : F × V → V obeys 
distributivity (in the following two senses):  
iii) ∀(α,β) ∈F  ∀ ϕ ∈ V  :  (α +β)⋅ϕ = (α⋅ϕ) + (α⋅ϕ)   
iv) ∀(ϕ , φ) ∈ V  ∀γ ∈F  : γ ⋅ (ϕ + φ) = (γ ⋅ϕ) + (γ ⋅ φ).  
 
Defn A2.4: (Algebra) An algebra Α, then, is defined as a vector space 〈V, F, * , ⋅,• 〉 endowed with an 
associative binary mapping  • into  Α (i.e., • : Α× Α→ Α, such that ∀(ψ, ϕ, φ) ∈G:  (ψ • ϕ) • φ =ψ •( 
ϕ • φ) ≡ ψ • ϕ •φ  denoted, by convention, by the “×” symbol, though not necessarily to be 
understood as ordinary multiplication on the real numbers) This can be re-stated  by saying that   〈Α, 
•〉 forms a semigroup (i.e. a set Α closed under the binary associative product •), while 〈Α, *〉 forms 
an Abelian group. 
 
Examples of algebras include the class of Lie algebras, i.e. an algebra dA whose ‘product’ • is 
defined by an (associative) Lie product (denoted [ , ] )obeying the Jacobi Identity: ∀(ς,ξ,ζ)∈ dA : [[ς,ξ],ζ] 
+ [[ξ,ζ],ς] + [[ζ,ς],ξ] = 0.  The structure of classes of infinitesimal generators in many applications often 
form a Lie algebra.  Lie algebras, in addition, are often characterized by the behavior of their structure 
constants C.  For any elements of a Lie algebra ςµ ,ξν characterized by their covariant (or contravariant –if 
placed above) indices (µ ,ν), then a structure constant is the indicial function C(λ)σµν such that, for any ζρ 










,  , where N is the dimension of dA, and λ is the Lie Algebra’s contraction 
parameter.  A Lie algebra is stable whenever: 
 limλ→∞∨λ→0 C(λ)σµν  is well-defined for any structure constant  C(λ)σµν  and contraction parameter λ. 
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 I.e. a an algebraic structure 〈 F, + , × 〉 endowed with two binary operations such that 〈F, +〉 and 〈F, ×〉 form 
commutative groups and  + , ×  are connected by left (and right, because of commutativity) distributivity, i.e., 
∀(α,β,γ) ∈F : α ×(β + γ) = (α ×β) + (α ×γ). 
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Defn A2.5: (Clifford Algebra) .  A Clifford Algebra is a graded algebra endowed with the (non-
commutative) Clifford product.  That is to say: 
i.) For any two elements A, B in a Clifford algebra CL, their Clifford product is defined by: AB = 
A•B + A∧B, where A•B is their (commutative and associative) inner product, and A∧B is their 
anti-commutative, i.e. A∧B  = -B∧A, and associative  exterior (or Grassmann) product.  This 
naturally makes the Clifford product associative: A(BC) = (AB)C ≡ ABC.  Less obviously, 
however, for reasons that will be discussed below, is how the existence of an inverse A-1 for 
every (nonzero) Clifford element A arises from the Clifford product, i.e.: A-1A = I =  AA-1, 
where I is the unit pseudoscalar of CL.      
ii.) CL is equipped with an adjoint ↑ and grade operator < >r  (where < >r  is defined as isolating 
the rth grade of a Clifford element A) such that, for any Clifford elements A, B:  <AB >↑r  =  
(-1)C(r,2) <B↑A↑
 
>r   (where: C(r ,2) = r!/(2!(r – 2)!)  = r(r – 1)/2. )  
 
Hence a general Clifford element (or multivector) A of Clifford algebra CL of maximal grade N = 
dimV (i.e the dimension of the underlying vector space structure of the Clifford algebra) is expressed by 
the linear combination:  
A = α(0)A0 + α(1)A1  + α(2)A2+ … + α(N)AN    (A.3.1)  
where: {α(k)  | 1 ≤ k ≤ N } are the elements of the scalar field (expansion coefficients) while {Ak  | 1 ≤ 
k ≤ N } are the pure Clifford elements, i.e. <Ak>l  = Ak whenever k = l, and <Ak>l  = 0 otherwise, while 
for a general multivector (A.3.1), <A>l  = α(l)Al  , for  
1 ≤ l ≤ N  
 
Hence, the pure Clifford elements live in their associated closed Clifford subspaces CL(k) of grade k, i.e. 
CL = CL(0) ⊕ CL(1) ⊕…⊕CL(N) .    
Consider the following example: Let V = R3, i.e. the underlying vector space for CL  is a 3 
dimensional Euclidean space R3 = { =rr (x,y,z) | x∈ R, y∈ R,  z∈ R}.  Then the maximum grade for 
Clifford Algebra over R3 , i.e. CL(R3) is N = dimR3 = 3.  Hence:  
 CL(R3)  = CL(0) ⊕ CL(1) ⊕ CL(2) ⊕CL(3)   where: CL(0)  (the Clifford subspace of grade 0) is (algebraically) 
isomorphic to the real numbers R.86  CL(1)  (the Clifford subspace of grade 1) is algebraically isomorphic 
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 Since the real numbers are a field, they’re obviously describable as an algebra, in which their underlying ‘vector 




to the Complex numbers C.  CL(2)  (the Clifford subspace of grade 2) is algebraically isomorphic the 
Quaternions H.  CL(3)  (the Clifford subspace of grade 3) is algebraically isomorphic to the Octonions O. 
 To understand why the Clifford algebra over R3 would invariably involve closed subspaces with 
elements related to the unit imaginary  i =√-1 (and some of its derivative notions thereon, in the case of 
the Quaternions and Octonions) entails a closer study of the nature of the Clifford product.  Defn. A.2.4 i) 
deliberately leaves the Grassman product under-specified.  I now fill in the details here.  First, it is 
important to note that ∧ is a grade-raising operation: for any pure Clifford element Ak (where k < N = 
dimV) and B1 , then <AkB1> = k + 1.  It is for this reason that pure Clifford elements of grade k are often 
called multivectors.  Conversely, the inner product • is a grade-lowering operation: for any pure Clifford 
element Ak (where k < N = dimV) and B1 , then <Ak•B1> = k – 1.  (Hence the inner product is often referred 
to as a contraction). 
 The reason for the grade-raising, anti-commutative nature of the Grassman product is historically 
attributed to Grassman’s geometric notions of (directed) line segments, (rays) areas, volumes, 
hypervolumes, etc.   For example, in the case of two vectors BA
rr
,  , their associated directed area 
segments  ABBA
vrrr
∧∧ , are illustrated below: 
  B
r





∧       AB
rr
∧     
           A
r
     A
r
 
  Fig. A.2.1: Directed Areas 
 
The notion of directed area, volume, hypervolume segments indeed survives, to a certain limited sense, in 
the vector-algebraic notion of ‘cross-product.’  For example, the magnitude of the cross-product BA
rr
×  is 
precisely the area of the parallelogram spanned by BA
rr
,  as depicted in Fig. A.2.1.  The difference, 
however, lies in the fixity of grade in the case of BA
rr
× , in the sense that the anti-commutativity is 
geometrically attributed to the directionality of the vector BA
rr
×  (of positive sign in the case of right-
handed coordinate system) perpendicular to the plane spanned by BA
rr
, .  This limits the notion of the 
vector cross-product, as it can only be defined for spaces of maximum dimensionality 3.87  On the other 
hand, the Grassmann product of multivectors interpreted as directed areas, volumes, and hypervolumes is 
unrestricted by the dimensionality of the vector space. 
                                               
87
 “[T]he vector algebra of Gibbs…was effectively the end of the search for a unifying mathematical language and 
the beginning of a proliferation of novel algebraic systems, created as and when they were needed; for example, 
spinor algebra, matrix and tensor algebra, differential forms, etc.” (Lansenby, et. al. (2000), 21)   
48 
 
 The connection with the algebraic behavior of  i =√-1 lies in the inherently anti-commutative 
aspect (i.e. the Grassmann component) of the Clifford product, as discussed above.  To see this, consider 
the even simpler case of V = R2 (as discussed, for example, in Lasenby, et. al. (2000), 26-29).  Then; N = 
dimR2 = 2.  Moreover, R2 = ( )21 ˆ,ˆ ee , where 〈…〉 denotes the span and ( )21 ˆ,ˆ ee  are the ordered pair of 
orthonormal vectors (parallel, for example, to the x and y axes.)  Hence: ,1ˆˆ 2221 == ee  and 
0ˆˆˆˆ 1221 =•=• eeee .  So: 121221211221 ˆˆˆˆˆˆˆˆˆˆˆˆ eeeeeeeeeeee −=∧−=∧=∧+•= .  Hence: 
( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( )( ) 1ˆˆˆˆˆˆˆˆˆˆˆˆˆˆˆˆˆˆˆˆ 22212211221121212121221 −=−=−=−=== eeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeee  (using the anti-
commutativity and associativity of the Clifford product.)  Hence, the multivector 21 ˆˆ ee  is algebraically 
isomorphic to i =√-1.  Moreover, ( ) 2121 ˆˆˆˆ eeee −=  and ( ) 1221 ˆˆˆˆ eeee = , by the same simple algebraic 
maneuvering.  Geometrically, then, the multivector 21 ˆˆ ee  when multiplying on the left has the effect of a 






























ˆ 21 ee  
Moreover, for CL(R2) the multivector 21 ˆˆ ee is the unit pseudoscalar, i.e. the element of maximal 
grade.  In general, for any Clifford Algebra CL(V), where dimV = N, and V = 〈(γ1, γ2, …, γN)〉, where the 
basis elements aren’t necessarily orthonormal, the unit pseudoscalar I of  CL(V) is:  I = γ1γ2… γN.  In 
general, for grade k (where 1 ≤ k ≤ N) the closed subspaces CL(k) of grade k in CL(V) = CL(0) ⊕ CL(1) 
⊕…⊕CL(N) have dimensionality C(N,k) = N!/[k!(N – k)!], i.e are spanned by C(N,k) = N!/[k!(N – k)!] multivectors 
of degree k.  Hence the total number of Clifford basis elements generated by the Clifford product acting 







,2 .  The unit pseudoscalar is 
therefore the (one) multivector (only one there are C(N,N) =1 of them, modulo sign or order of 
mutliplication) spanning the closed Clifford subspace of maximal grade N. 
For example, in the case of  CL(R3)  = CL(0) ⊕ CL(1) ⊕ CL(2) ⊕CL(3)  , where: 
R3 = ( )321 ˆ,ˆ,ˆ eee :  ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 1233231312232110 ,,,,,,,1 eICLeeeCLeeeCLRCL ====≅=   
(where the abbreviation ei…k = ki ee ˆ...ˆ is adopted).  As demonstrated in the case of CL(R2) the multivector, 
the unit psuedoscalar I should not be interpreted as a multiplicative identity, i.e. it is certainly not the case 
that for any A∈ CL(V), AI = A = IA.  Rather, the unit pseudoscalar is adopted to define an element of dual 
grade A* : for any pure Clifford element Ak, (where 0≤ k <N)  : the grade of AI (or A*) is N- k, and vice 
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versa.  Thus an inverse element A-1 can in principle be constructed, for every nonzero A∈ CL(V).  So the 
linear equation AX = B has the formal solution X = A-1B in  CL(V).  “Much of the power of geometric 
(Clifford) algebra lies in this property of invertibility.” (Lasenby, et. al. (2000), 25)    
 
Appendix B: The Case of Spinors (Hestenes) 
 
Clifford algebras can provide a complete notation for describing certain phenomena in physics that 
would otherwise require several different mathematical formalisms.  For instance, in present-day quantum 
mechanics and field theory, a variety of different mathematical formalisms are often introduced: 3 
dimensional vector algebra, Hilbert space methods, spinor algebra, diffeomorphism algebra on smooth 
manifolds, etc.  This is due in part to the domain-specific nature of the aforementioned, all tailored to 
apply to a particularly specific context, but relatively restricted in their power of generalization.   
For example, consider the simplest case of the three-dimensional vector algebra originally developed 
by Gibbs. The notion of cross-product cannot be generalized to spaces above a dimensionality 3, yet the 
Clifford multivector describing directed area, volumes, and hypervolumes applies to any n-dimensional 
space.88  According to Hestenes the aforementioned restriction of the cross-product to 3 dimensions 
introduces unnecessary redundancies in the depiction of spinors in standard quantum mechanics: 
 
Physicists generally regard the σk [Pauli spin matrices] as three components of a single vector, instead 







 …and to 
facilitate manipulation they employ the identity: 
( )wviwvwv rrrrrrrrr ×•+•=•• σσσ ))(( … a good example of the redundancy in the language of physics 
which complicates the manipulations and obscures the meanings unnecessarily. (1986, 323) 
 
The redundancy in the above identity ( )wviwvwv rrrrrrrrr ×•+•=•• σσσ ))((  is due to its ‘overlapping 
geometric content’: The (vector) dot and cross products of course comprise the binary operations of 
standard (Gibbs’) vector algebra in R3, while the Pauli spin matrices ( ( )321 ,, σσσσ =r ) acting as the 
‘vector coefficients’ belong to the spinor algebra C2, i.e. the 2×2 matrix algebra consisting of complex-
valued entries.89  The geometric contents of R3 and C2 can be unified, however, when one instead 
                                               
88
 For further details, see Appendix 
89
 As shown in the Appendix, C2 is algebraically isomorphic to a Clifford Algebra of grade 2. 
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considers σk as generators of a Clifford algebra, thereby “eliminat[ing] all redundancy incorporating both 
languages into a single coherent language.”90  
So in a narrow sense, Clifford or geometric algebras unify the geometric content of mathematical 
formulations of physical theories, as Hestenes (1984, 1986) and others have demonstrated in the case of 
quantum theory and field theory.  But this also implies a broader notion of unification. Using the same 
reasoning as demonstrated above in the case of the Pauli spin algebra, Hestenes (1986) likewise shows 
how the 4×4 matrix algebra C4 of Dirac spinors γµ91 is algebraically isomorphic to the Clifford algebra C4, 
or the Clifford algebra generated by 4-dimensional vectors with complex coefficients.  In several steps he 
proceeds to show how this Clifford algebra is projectively isomorphic to the Minkowski spacetime 
algebra R1,3, or the Clifford algebra generated by four linearly independent rotation matrices in the 
Minkowski spacetime R1,3.92 Writes Hestenes: 
 
The relation of the Dirac theory [of spinors] to classical electrodynamics is not well 
understood…[with the projective extension into R1,3  however] it is more intimate than originally 
thought. This intimate relation between …the Dirac theory and trajectories of the classical theory 
[shown in the R1,3  reformulation] provides a much more detailed correspondence between the 
classical and quantum theories than the conventional approach using expectation values and 
Ehrenfest’s theorem…[T]he basic idea…we have been exploiting provides a general geometrical 
approach to the interpretation of the Dirac theory as follows…any solution ψ =ψ(x) of the Dirac 
Equation of form ψ = (ρeiβ)1/2R [where ρ, is a probability density, R  is a spinor representation of a 
Lorentz transformation Λ, and β is an arbitrary phase factor] determines a field of orthonormal frames 
eµ = eµ (x)…at each spacetime point there’s a streamline x = x(τ)” with tangent v = v(x(τ)). [Then] eµ = 
eµ (x(τ)) is to be regarded as a ‘comoving frame’, on the streamline, where e1 , e2 rotate about the ‘spin 
axis’ e3 . (332-333)   
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, then the above identity with its (otherwise 
geometrically overlapping content) now simply is represented as: wvwvwv vvrrrr ∧+•= .  But this is just precisely 
the definition of the Clifford product of two 3-vectors! For further details, see Appendix.  
91
 Dirac introduced such 4×4 matrices as the ‘coefficients’ of his equation γµ(i∂µ -eAµ)Ψ = mΨ  which linearizes the 
Klein-Gordon equation (KGE).  The latter was the first attempt to make the Schroedinger equation Lorentz-
covariant, though its non-linearity (being, as in the case of the Schroedinger equation, a 2nd order differential 
equation) introduced solutions with indefinite (negative valued) probabilities in Minkowski spacetime R1,3 (the 4 
dimensional spacetime with metric signature (1,3)).  This is remedied by linearizing the KGE in the case of 
developing the Dirac equation, but only at the expense of introducing such 4x4 complex valued into the equation’s 
coefficient ring.    
92
 Hestenes (1986), 325-326. Borrowing from Luonesto (1981, 721), who shows that every complex Clifford algebra 
of dimension (or grade) 2n is algebraically isomorphic to the Clifford algebra generated by the p+q dimensional 
(real) space Rp,q of signature (p,q), where: p+q = 2n+1.  Hence: C4≅ R3⊗R2 ≅ R4,1 (where ‘≅’ means: ‘is algebraic 
isomorphic to’). One can then set up a projective map identifying the Clifford algebra over Minkowski spacetime 
R1,3 with the even subalgebra R4,1+  of R4,1 .   
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the (electron’s proper time) rate of change of R (the spinor representation of the Lorentz transformation Λ 
in the solution of canonical form ψ = (ρeiβ)1/2R ) as proportional to the product of the electron’s charge 







 as an 
expression of the precession of the comoving frame eµ = eµ (x(τ)), with an additional rotation determined 
by a gauge factor. “It should be of genuine physical interest to identify and analyze any deviations from 
this classical rotation which QM might imply.” (333)  Hestenes (1985, 13) for instance suggests that such 
expressions of precession provide adequate models for the supposed Zitterbewegung mechanism of a free 
electron. 
The upshot of all this, concludes Hestenes, runs as follows: 
My objective…has been to explicate the geometric structure of the Dirac theory and its physical 
significance.  My approach may seem radical at first sight, but…it [is] ultimately conservative…by 
restricting my mathematical language to spacetime algebra [i.e. the Clifford algebra over Minkowski 
space R1,3] I allow nothing in my formulation of physical theory without an interpretation of 
spacetime geometry…[though] I am not opposed to investigating possibilities for unifying physical 
theory by extending spacetime geometry to higher dimensions…we still have a lot to learn about the 
physical implications of conventional spacetime structure (346) 
 
Hence, in the broader sense of unification, Clifford or geometric algebras can unify the ontological 
content of mathematical formulations of physical theories.  David Hestenes suggests this in so many 
words, in his Clifford-algebraic characterization of Pauli and Dirac spinors, as briefly summarized above, 
as well as in his Clifford algebraic characterization of the Weinberg-Salam model which generalizes the 
electromagnetic gauge group to include the theory of weak interactions. (1986, 334-342)  Now in the 
standard (non-Clifford) formulations of quantum theory, the interpretation of Dirac spinors in quantum 
field theory remains obscure.  Hestenes’ Clifford algebraic reformulation of the Dirac theory simplified 
and clarified its ontology, by indicating its interconnection with classical EM theory, vis-à-vis the 
intricate algebra of spins and rotations in Minkowski spacetime, represented by the Clifford algebra over 
R1,3. Hestenes concludes: 
The most important thing…from the [Clifford algebraic] reformulation [of the Dirac theory] is 
that the imaginary Idi 1−=  [where Id is the identity operator] has definite geometrical and 
physical meaning…represent[ing] the generator of rotations in a spacelike plane associated with 
spin… Idi 1−= can be identified with the spin bivector σrhiS =ˆ …[This identification] has far 
reaching consequences…[for instance] when the Schroedinger equation is derived as an 
approximation to the Dirac equation…[this] implies that a degenerate representation of the spin 
direction by the unit imaginary has been implicit in Schroedinger equation all along. (331) 
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He is proposing a reduction involving the conceptually problematic nature of the role played by 
the unit imaginary i in quantum theory to ontological claims concerning rotations in R3 (in the case of 
Pauli spinors) and in Minkowski spacetime R1,3 (in the case of the Dirac theory).  As mentioned in the 
previous sections, geometric algebras present a far more nuanced and systematic way of mathematically 
representing all possible rotational transformations in spaces involving any dimensionality than standard 
vector methods.94  Such physical implications include the ontology of all possible rotational dynamics in 
spacetime. Clifford algebras provide a natural means of mathematically representing such 
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